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This study aimed to assess the determinants and deterrents of profit shifting, which can 
occur as a result of corporate income tax competition, with a view to aid in collecting 
sufficient tax revenue to meet public spending requirements.  
 
The study theoretically and empirically analysed the effectiveness of the introduction 
of the South African transfer pricing regulations on deterring the occurrence of profit 
shifting in South Africa using annual financial information of South African parented 
multinational enterprises for the period 2010 – 2017.  
 
The study established that the implementation of transfer pricing regulations resulted in a 
reduction in profit shifting that became increasingly more prominent as the rules became 
stricter.  
 
Based on the findings of the study, it is recommended that the South Africa government 
should allocate sufficient resources to ensure that the transfer pricing regulations are 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
1.1. Background of the study  
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (2019) explains 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS or profit shifting) as “tax avoidance strategies that 
exploit gaps and mismatches in tax rules to artificially shift profits to low or no-tax 
locations”.  
 
Historically, Multinational Enterprises1 (MNEs) have made use of aggressive tax planning 
through profit shifting in order to minimise their overall group tax burden. One of the ways 
in which profit shifting is achieved is through transfer pricing2 or, more specifically, transfer 
mispricing. Transfer mispricing or the manipulation of transfer prices is thought to be a key 
instrument in profit shifting (Liu, et al., 2017). Transfer mispricing would involve 
arrangements where transactions between members of an MNE group are priced at an 
artificial price, in order to shift income or expenses from one region to a more attractive 
region from the MNEs perspective (Huxham & Haupt, 2005). In general, profit shifting has 
occurred when the allocation of profits across an MNE Group’s subsidiaries or value chain 
is not reflective of the true value added by each subsidiary or by each link of the value 
chain – this means that the profits may not be reported in the jurisdiction where the 
economic activity produced it and where value was created (Reynolds & Wier, 2016).  
 
Profit shifting as a result of transfer mispricing is an important economic topic because it 
manipulates and reduces the amount of profit reported in a country and the resulting tax 
revenues to the country are reduced as a result. Furthermore, there have been numerous 
cases in the media over the past few years on aggressive international tax avoidance 
techniques employed by large MNE’s including Google, Apple and Amazon (Riedel, et al., 
2015). These cases have strengthened concerns and public debates about multinational 
income shifting to low tax regions. The matter of Google was particularly prominent in the 
media when, in 2017, one of the MNE members, Google Alphabet, reported USD23 billion 
in revenue in Bermuda an island tax haven which has a corporate income tax (CIT) rate 
of zero. 
                                                          
 
1 Multinational enterprises are usually large corporations, which are incorporated in one country and 
which produce or sell goods or services in various countries other than its home country (Doob, 2014). 
2 Transfer pricing is the general term, which refers to the pricing of cross‐border, inter-company 





In a critical study by Torslov et al. (2019), the researchers found that MNE’s shifted more 
than USD650 billion in profits to tax havens in 2016. This had an overall effect on global 
corporate tax receipts of around 10%.  
 
According to the researchers, what made the Torslov et al. (2019) study particularly 
ground breaking was that, until recently, this research was not possible. It is explained 
that recently, the statistical institutes of many countries have begun releasing new 
macroeconomic data known as “foreign affiliates’ statistics”. This data allows researchers 
to obtain an overview of where MNE’s book their profits 3 (Torslov, et al., 2019).   
 
The table below summarises the findings of the study in relation to South Africa. In this 
regard, it should be noted that South Africa loses 7% of its corporate tax revenues to tax 
havens – the specific havens are detailed below.  
 
Table 1: South Africa’s profit shifting statistics (Torslov, et al., 2019) 
 
 
Profits lost  
(USD, Millions) 
Tax revenue lost 
(USD, Millions) 
Tax revenue lost 
(% of corp. tax 
revenue) 
All havens 4,127 1,155 7% 
    
EU havens 1,716 480 3% 
Belgium 104 29 0% 
Cyprus 8 2 0% 
Ireland 766 214 1% 
Luxembourg 376 105 1% 
Malta 5 1 0% 
Netherlands 459 128 1% 
Non-EU tax havens 2,411 675 4% 
Switzerland 88 25 0% 
                                                          
 
3 Presumably, this information comes from the new (mostly) worldwide requirement of Country-by-




Bermuda, Caribbean, Puerto  
Rico, Hong Kong, Singapore  
and others 
2,322 650 4% 
 
Similarly, in another study conducted prior to the Torslov et al. (2019) study, Reynolds and 
Wier (2016), estimated that 7% of South African MNE subsidiary profits are shifted from 
South Africa to MNE parent companies in low tax regions. The dataset these researchers 
used included detailed accounts on financial information such as taxable income and net 
financial income, covering the period 2009-2014. According to the researchers, this 
research was the first attempt at quantifying profit shifting in the African context.  
 
The BEPS problem and protection and preservation of the tax base is significantly more 
important for developing countries such as South Africa (UNCTAD, 2015). One of the 
reasons for this is because tax revenues are very meaningful in relation to these countries’ 
revenue pool and can be easily depleted due to a lack of administrative capabilities and 
other socio-economic problems which developing countries may face (Johannesen, et al., 
2016). According to the OECD (2014), “developing countries face difficulties in building 
the capacity needed to implement highly complex rules and to challenge well-advised and 
experienced MNEs”. In addition, Reynolds and Wier (2016) and UNCTAD (2015) note that 
the activities of MNEs constitute a large portion of the overall activities of developing 
countries and a large portion of MNE’s investments in developing countries comes from 
low tax regions.  
 
South Africa is a developing country as per the World Bank definition for high income 
countries as countries with gross domestic product per capita (GDP) of USD12,236 or 
more (World Bank, 2018). As per the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 2018 statistics, 
South Africa had a GDP per capita of USD6,182 for 2017 and an average GDP per capita 
of USD6,720 for the eight-year period 2010 - 2017.  
 
In 2019, the OECD published a report on the revenue statistics in Africa. The report 
presents comprehensive data on both tax and non-tax revenues for 26 African countries 
(OECD/ATAF/AUC, 2019).  
 
In South Africa, the tax-to-GDP ratio, which refers to total tax revenue as a percentage of 




to-GDP ratio is that it provides an indication of the tax burden: a high percentage indicates 
that a high amount of tax is collected relative to the size of the economy (Stats SA, 2019). 
The statistics also show that South Africa collects a higher portion of taxes to GDP 
compared to an average of 26 African countries (OECD/ATAF/AUC, 2019).  
 
Figure 1: Tax-to-GDP ratio (OECD, 2019) (Author’s compilation) 
 
 
The Africa (26) average is not available before 2008 due to missing data in some 
countries. 
 
The fact that South Africa has a high tax-to-GDP ratio is an indication that South Africa 
relies on its tax revenues to provide public services such as building infrastructure or 
maintaining public goods.  
 
As a point of reference, the tax-to-GDP ratio of the median developing country, was 19.2% 
in 1996-2002 (Janbunjong, 2009). Therefore, the South African tax-to-GDP ratio is higher 
than the average – stressing the significance of tax revenues to the South African 
economic model.  
 
Another comparison of the tax-to-GDP ratio can be made with reference to more 
developed countries, on the assumption that a developing country may want to transform 
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have tax structures that allow for greater revenue collection which have contributed to their 
growth.  In a 2019 report, the OECD notes that the unweighted average tax-to-GDP ratio 
in the OECD area was 34.2% in 2017 (OECD, 2019). The OECD area is comprised of 36 
countries, most of which are high-income economies and are regarded as developed 
economies (International Monetary Fund , 2020). In order to achieve a comparable tax-to-
GDP ratio, South Africa would need to collect significantly more tax revenues. One way of 
doing so would be through an increase in CIT revenues brought on by protection of the 
CIT base.  
 
The importance of tax revenues is further amplified by the fact that South Africa’s non-tax 
revenues amounted to only 0.5% of GDP in 2017 – far lower than tax revenues as a 
percentage of GDP (28.4%) in the same year. Of the 26 countries shown in the report, 
South Africa’s non-tax revenues as a percentage of GDP was the lowest 
(OECD/ATAF/AUC, 2019).  
 
Figure 2: Non-tax revenue-to-GDP (OECD, 2019) (Author’s compilation) 
 
 



























Figure 3: Non-tax revenue (OECD, 2019) (Author’s compilation) 
 
 
In addition, the importance of CITs is illustrated by considering the tax structure of South 
Africa. Tax structure refers to the split of each particular type of tax within the total tax 
revenue. Personal income tax accounted for the highest share of tax revenues in South 
Africa in 2017 (34%). Value added taxes were the second-highest contributors to tax 
revenues in 2017 (22%) and CITs contributed 16% of total tax revenues 
(OECD/ATAF/AUC, 2019). This is a higher contribution percentage compared with the 
African average, Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) and OECD4 countries, which 
highlights the importance of CITs for South Africa specifically.  
 
It should be noted that CITs account for a greater portion of tax revenues in South Africa 
than they do in developed OECD countries on average (9.3% in 2017) (OECD, 2019). 
However, OECD countries appear to collect far greater revenue from other sources, for 
example social security which accounted for 26% in 2017 versus 1% in South Africa in 
2017 (OECD, 2019) and (OECD/ATAF/AUC, 2019). Therefore, it is not possible to 
compare South Africa’s percentage contributions of CIT with that of the average OECD 
area.  
 
                                                          
 




































Based on the statistics shown above, taxes and CITs are a critical source of income to 
South Africa. Therefore, the protection of the South African corporate tax base is of key 
importance to ensure that sufficient revenues are collected.   
 
As a result of the losses experienced due to profit shifting, countries need to implement 
strategies which could successfully curb these profit shifting activities to maintain their 
respective tax bases and ensure appropriate tax revenues. One of the solutions to 
controlling the problem is to introduce legislative policy which targets and aims to prevent 
transfer mispricing, which is noted as an activity that leads to profit shifting. The 
introduction of explicit transfer pricing legislation is linked to the 2015 BEPS project (the 
BEPS reform) and specifically to Actions 8 – 10 which are aimed at aligning transfer pricing 
outcomes with value creation. The BEPS project came as a result of political leaders 
around the world identifying international tax issues as a serious concern due to the 
increase in the integration of national economies and markets and the concern of profit 
shifting arising as a result.  
 
1.2. Purpose and rationale of the study  
The research conducted in this study will consider the vast literature available on BEPS 
in order to document the determinants and deterrents of BEPS. In addition, the research 
will consider one of the approaches to controlling the problem, namely, the implementation 
of explicit and stringent transfer pricing legislation and the effect this may have on reducing 
transfer mispricing as a method of profit shifting with an aim to ensuring that tax authorities 
collect appropriate tax revenues. The research on the implementation of transfer pricing 
legislation will focus on South African parented MNEs with a view to determining the effect 
on South Africa specifically and on similar developing countries.  
 
This is a significant topic as South Africa (a developing economy) has recently 
implemented explicit transfer pricing legislation relevant for South African members of 
MNEs5, i.e. companies which are South African resident tax payers which belong to a 
MNE.  The South African tax system was "source-based" prior to 2001 and was changed 
to "residence-based" from 2001 onwards. Source-based tax systems tax income in the 
                                                          
 
5 South Africa has had transfer pricing legislation in place since 1995. However, this legislation was 
made significantly more explicit, extensive and stringent in 2016 and was effective for most 




country in which it originates. The system is based on the premise that persons who derive 
income in a particular country should contribute to the cost of rendering government 
services in that country. Residence-based tax systems tax the income of residents of a 
country irrespective of which country that income is earned in, and non-residents are only 
subject to tax on domestic source income (South African Reserve Bank, 2015).  In some 
cases there may be some uncertainty regarding where income originates from, which may 
give rise to the concept of double taxation, where the same income is taxed in multiple 
jurisdictions. Residence-based systems avoid the uncertainties of determining where 
income originates from and reduces the risk of double taxation occurring, since it reduces 
the chance of conflicting claims to taxable income (Pinto, 2007). Most countries in the 
world follow a residence-based tax system (Ernst & Young, 2019).  
 
As explained above, it is important to consider South Africa specifically, as developing 
countries face particular socio-economic issues (such as administrative constraints) that 
may affect whether or not legislation has an impact on profit shifting.  
 
1.3. Objective of the study  
The purpose of this research is to survey the information available on BEPS as well as to 
address the gap in information relating to the effect of legislative policy (and transfer 
pricing legislation in particular) on the reduction of profit shifting specifically on South 
Africa and, consequently, developing countries. The research will consider the issue of 
profit shifting as well as whether the implementation of transfer pricing regulations is likely 
to reduce the phenomenon, and to what extent. It should be noted that the research uses 
financial data from the period 2010 to 2017. This time period was before the Covid-19 
pandemic and the impact of the pandemic was not taken into account.  
 
1.4. Research Questions  
The study aims to address the following questions:  
 
a) What are the determinants and deterrents of BEPS?  
b) Does legislative policy, specifically transfer pricing legislation, have the potential 
to deter profit shifting?  
c) Does legislative policy, which is based on policies implemented by developed 





1.5. Hypothesis  
The literature on profit shifting will show that profit shifting can have harmful effects on a 
country and that profit shifting through transfer mispricing is a real occurrence that has a 
negative effect on a country’s revenue. Further, the utilisation of legislative measures 
through the adoption of transfer pricing regulations in South Africa will lead to a reduction 
in the occurrence of profit shifting by multinationals operating in the country. The tightening 
of the legislative measures would lead to further reductions in the occurrence of profit 
shifting by MNEs operating in the country. The results may also be representative of other 
developing countries.  
 
That being said, developing countries also face a plethora of complex socio-economic 
issues such as corruption and administrative constraints that may hinder the reduction of 
profit shifting even where regulations are stringent. Therefore, the reduction in profit 
shifting due to the implementation of stringent regulations may be lower for developing 
countries than it is for developed countries.  
 
1.6. Significance of the study 
This study is significant because it has the potential to determine whether the current 
South African policy is an effective deterrent of profit shifting from the country in order to 
protect and maintain the corporate tax base in South Africa. Furthermore, given the 
consequences of the loss in the South African tax base, this study is aimed at encouraging 
further research in this area, particularly in the South African and developing country 
context.  
 
The study has added to the growing literature on this topic in general and in relation to 
South Africa and developing countries specifically, and can be used as a basis for further 
research in this important field.  
 
1.7. Expected contribution of the study 
This research is aimed at determining the impact of policy measures taken by government 
on profit shifting in South Africa.  
 
It is expected to contribute to the field of economics by determining whether policy is an 
effective tool in counteracting profit shifting and maintaining the South African fiscus – i.e. 




purpose. The results could serve as a tool for government in relation to decision making 
on whether to proceed on the current course of action.  
 
This dissertation could potentially also serve as an addition to the limited profit shifting and 
transfer pricing research available on developing countries and South Africa in particular.  
 
1.8. Future developments  
The study also serves as an instrument for further research. Since it is performed very 
close to the initial implementation of the BEPS reform, there is large scope to expand on 
this study and determine whether the results hold true in future. There is also scope to 
expand the sample dataset and consider the effects on a larger or different (perhaps non-
South African) sample of companies.   
 
1.9. Organisation of the study  
The rest of the study contains the following:  
 
a) Chapter Two presents the conceptual framework which underpins this study.  This 
chapter outlines the concepts of globalisation and tax competition and also 
provides further details on how profit shifting affects an economy.    
b) Chapter Three presents a literature review which explores the existing literature 
on the profit shifting phenomenon, its existence and impact on the world and the 
potential countermeasures which could be employed in response to this 
phenomenon. 
c) Chapter Four provides further relevant statistics on CIT in the South African 
context, and goes on to present the relevant CIT and transfer pricing policies in 
South Africa. The chapter also presents the relevant studies performed in 
response to BEPS.  
d) Chapter Five describes the research methodology utilised in performing the 
research study, including descriptions of the data collected, the method of 
analysis and the assumptions and expectations of the study.   
e) Chapter Six presents the econometric analysis and the empirical findings for the 
study using the model and the methodology discussed in the previous chapter. 
The chapter provides an interpretation of the empirical relationship between the 




f) Chapter Seven presents a summary of the findings of this research. It consists of 
the summary of the empirical research findings in relation to the hypotheses of 
the study as well as recommendations for further research. 
 
1.10. Conclusion 
This chapter presents background information and statistics pertaining to the importance 
of CIT revenues in South Africa and the threat that profit shifting poses to those revenues. 
The chapter also specifies the main objective of conducting the research, which is to 
review the information available on BEPS and to address the gap in information relating 
to the effect of legislative policy, and transfer pricing legislation in particular, on the 
reduction of profit shifting specifically on South Africa and, consequently, developing 
countries. This chapter also explains the questions the research aims to answer, the 
hypotheses of this study and highlights the significance and expected contributions of the 
research. The conceptual framework upon which this study is based is discussed in the 






CHAPTER 2: CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1. Introduction   
This chapter provides a conceptual background to the research contained in the following 
chapters. The chapter outlines the concepts of globalisation and tax competition, which 
are the main concepts, and form the basis upon which, harmful effects including profit 
shifting, have emerged and continue to occur. This chapter also provides further details 
on how profit shifting affects an economy.    
 
2.2. Globalisation   
The integration of economies, or globalisation, according to Micklethwait & Wooldridge 
(2013), is the “freer movement of goods, services, ideas and people around the world”. 
Globalisation, together with the removal of barriers to trade, results in increasing numbers 
of companies which engage in international activities (Salvador, et al., 2012). 
 
Globalisation leads to the expansion of markets, which aids global welfare-enhancing 
capital flows across international borders. This process improves welfare and living 
standards around the world by improving the allocation and utilisation of resources 
(OECD, 1998). 
 
Globalisation has resulted in countries being required to be more transparent and 
accountable in the administration of their economies. Policymakers are incentivised to 
reform policies as a result of globalisation and countries are benefitting from the increases 
in international flows of capital, technology, and information. Initially, these opportunities 
were mostly exploited by the larger economies. However, after some time, other 
developing or emerging economies also sought to enter other markets besides their own 
and attract global flows of investments (Abed & Gupta, 2002). 
 
Globalisation is thought to bring nations closer together. However, it has also brought 
about increased competition amongst governments for corporate tax bases – i.e. CIT 
competition (Mintz & Smart, 2001). The dismantling of international barriers can foster 
competition between countries. This is because it causes capital, which is a major 
component of tax bases, to become more sensitive to international tax rate differentials 





There are new ways for MNE’s to minimise, avoid or evade taxes due to globalisation and 
this phenomenon has also created opportunities for countries to develop tax policies 
aimed principally at redirecting mobile capital to tax efficient locations. These actions can 
bring about distortions in the normal trade and investment patterns and investment and 
can lead to reduced global welfare (OECD, 1998).  
 
2.3. CIT competition   
The accelerating process of globalisation and the resulting integration of national 
economies has led to a large increase in the potential impact that any given domestic tax 
policy can have on foreign economies. As highlighted in the preceding section, 
globalisation has also formed part of the motivation for tax reforms and has urged 
governments to evaluate their tax systems and public services offered on an ongoing basis 
with an aim to enhance the “fiscal climate” for investment (OECD, 1998). This focus on 
the use of tax systems to improve the fiscal climate creates the phenomenon of “tax 
competition”.  
 
Tax competition can be defined as “interactive tax setting by independent governments in 
a non-cooperative, strategic way”. In order for tax competition to transpire there must be 
“fiscal interdependence”, which occurs if tax bases tend to respond to international tax 
differentials. Favourable tax conditions can be introduced in a number of different ways in 
order to attract foreign capital, for example, through a reduction in tax burdens (Dietsch & 
Rixen, 2014). In other words, tax competition exists when governments use reductions in 
fiscal (tax) burdens to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), financial investment and 
critical skills by minimising the overall taxation level. The literature available on the 
determinants of FDI has identified that there are both policy and non-policy influences that 
impact and encourage FDI investment. Non-policy factors may include elements such as 
market size and political and economic stability. On the other hand, policy factors may 
include the level of regulation of the product and labour markets, CIT rates and 
infrastructure (Fedderke & Romm, 2004).  
 
When higher tax rates are applied to corporate profits, this lowers FDI returns, which 
discourages inbound FDI to a particular region (Fedderke & Romm, 2004). It has been 
illustrated that OECD countries actually do compete with each other through CIT policies 





The inflow of FDI is a critical contributor to economic growth and many countries have 
adopted incentives aimed at attracting foreign investors in an effort to accelerate their 
economic growth rate (Sedmihradsky & Klazar, 2002).  
 
Tax competition can lead to the development of tax schemes that have the potential to 
erode national tax bases of other countries. This means that tax competition causes tax 
policies in one economy to have ramifications on the economies of other countries, despite 
the fact that improving international co-operation would likely result in advantages for all 
countries concerned (OECD, 1998).  
 
2.4. The potential harmful effects of tax competition   
Tax competition may cause harmful effects due to intentional and unintentional 
mismatches between different countries’ tax systems. Intentional mismatches involve a 
country intentionally exploiting the interaction between their economy and another and 
their respective tax systems so as to erode the tax base of the other country. It is also 
possible for unintentional mismatches to exist. Unintentional mismatches may be 
exploited by taxpayers to the detriment of either one or both of the countries in question 
(OECD, 1998). 
 
Some of the adverse effects resulting from harmful tax competition can include changing 
the location of investments and enabling tax avoidance and evasion. This could result in 
a biased apportionment of resources that may lead to an overall reduction in global welfare 
(Weiner & Ault, 1998).  
 
Tax competition may lead to the propagation of harmful tax practices which have the 
potential for some damaging repercussions. The worst case scenario considers that tax 
competition leads to a “race to the bottom” where countries aim to apply extremely low or 
zero rated CITs (Griffith & Klemm, 2004).  
 
Therefore, it is essential that governments employ the necessary measures to protect their 
tax bases in order to circumvent the overall reduction in welfare derived from illicit flows 
motivated by tax. The measures taken should include strengthening their international co-





2.5. Profit shifting and the role of tax havens  
It is well documented that profit shifting occurs as a result of and is driven by international 
tax rate differentials.  Various sources exist in this regard, such as Grubert & Mutti (1991), 
Hines & Rice (1991), Huizinga & Laeven (2008), Egger et al. (2010), Heckemeyer & 
Overesch (2013), Dharmapala & Riedel (2013), and Fuest et al. (2013).   
 
Jurisdictions with little to no taxation coupled with a low regulatory or administrative 
burden, and that decline to share information with other tax authorities are known as “tax 
havens”. According to the OECD, the characteristics of a tax haven leads to a lack of 
“effective” taxation of income within its region (Weiner & Ault, 1998).  
 
There is a common view that a major challenge in terms of a developing country’s ability 
to raise required tax revenues arises from MNE firms engaging in activities aimed at 
shifting taxable profits out of developing countries with high tax rates towards tax havens 
in order to reduce their overall tax burden (Fuest & Riedel, 2010). 
 
Overall, as a result of globalisation and tax competition, there are increased opportunities 
for MNE’s to shift profits towards low tax jurisdictions and this has led to strategies being 
developed by MNEs to take advantage of this (Krautheim & Schmidt-Eisenlohr, 2009). 
 
2.6. The significance of tax revenues in developing countries  
The collection of tax revenues is an important factor for consideration for developing 
countries. Tax revenue collected from large companies is of particular importance as a 
source of revenue for these countries (United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, 2015). This is because the bulk of the revenue which these countries collect 
is from income taxes including corporate and individual taxes. Therefore, the protection of 
these tax bases is critical (Gcabo & Robinson, 2007).   
 
In developing economies such as South Africa, resources are required to be put towards 
their most efficient social uses and a lack of resources is likely to result in unfavourable 
impacts on domestic resource mobilization and can also impede sustainable economic 
growth. Tax revenues lost by governments of developing countries would be unavailable 
for use by those governments toward their intended purpose of reducing inequality, 
eradicating poverty and improving the standard of living for the citizens of that particular 




emphasised in the 2019 Medium Term Budget Statement which stated “in the context of 
weak growth … revenue shortfalls and rising spending pressures are threatening 
government’s ability to maintain existing levels of service provision and infrastructure 
investment” (National Treasury, 2019).  
 
2.7. Taxation and economic growth  
A study on the effect of taxes on economic growth by Helms (1985) illustrates that 
increases in taxes can aid economic growth assuming that increases in taxes leads to 
increased tax revenues, which are used by government to provide enhanced public 
services. Public services are highly valued by citizens and encourages overall productivity 
by, for example, improving infrastructure and creating knowledge through education.  
 
Another study found that reforming tax structures from indirect to direct taxes along with 
aiming government spending at promoting improved standards of living, produces better 
effects on growth. Factors that promote improved standards of living could be social 
programmes and public medical schemes, amongst others (Yi & Suyono, 2014). 
 
2.8. Government Spending  
As explained in the preceding section, tax revenues are of particular importance as a 
source of revenue for developing countries and revenues are required to be available by 
governments for spending. Many economists acknowledge the reasoning of adopting the 
Keynesian approach of increased government spending (i.e., fiscal stimulus) to push an 
economy out of a recession. The Keynesian school of thought considers that the economy 
consists of consumer spending, investment, government spending and net exports. This 
school of thinking purports that during a recession, economic growth can be achieved 
through an increase in government spending. In other words, the Keynesian approach 
purports that increased government spending stimulates an economy (Skidelsky, 2009).  
 
Supporters of maximising government spending assert that government spending on 
public programs provides valuable public goods such as education and infrastructure. 
These supporters also postulate that increases in government spending can support 
economic growth by ensuring people have more money available to them (Mitchell, 2005). 
In the Keynesian model, increases in government expenditure lead to the growth of the 
economy as a result of increased expenditure which encourages further production, 




mechanism of Keynesian theory (Fourie & Burger, 2009). According to Keynes's theory of 
fiscal stimulus through government expenditure, increased government spending will lead 
to increased business activity and a further increase in spending. The theory asserts that 
spending enhances aggregate output and generates further increases in income, which, 
if spent could result in growth in GDP, which is greater than the initial amount of the 
stimulus. 
 
2.9. The impact of tax evasion/corruption  
Private investment and government spending are major contributors to the rate of growth 
and volatility of GDP (Célimène, et al., 2013). In developing countries, the public sector 
plays a pivotal role in economic growth and sluggishness and volatility in economic growth 
are often related to inefficient tax collection systems which are not able to collect the 
revenues required to provide the necessary public goods and services such as 
infrastructure and education, which are needed to stimulate productive activities 
(Friedman, et al., 2000).  
 
Economists and policymakers have acknowledged for some time that institutions carry 
weight in determining economic performance. A view has emerged that corruption, poor 
governance and fragile and unstable institutions can considerably damage economic 
growth (Mauro, 2004). However, fighting corruption may be difficult because of the 
prominence of rent-seeking activities. Furthermore, building technologies that are able to 
detect tax evaders is an expensive task that many developing countries may not be able 
to afford (Célimène, et al., 2013).  
 
2.10. Conclusion  
This chapter provided a conceptual framework upon which the remainder of this study is 
based. The concept of globalisation was introduced along with the resulting phenomenon 
known as CIT competition. Tax competition has the potential to produce certain effects, 
which may be harmful to economies. One of these harmful effects includes BEPS and 
specifically, profit shifting towards tax havens.  
 
BEPS is an important concept in the South African context because of the importance of 
tax revenues to developing countries such as South Africa – this was discussed in this 




revenues stemming from the linkage between taxation and economic growth and 
specifically, government spending and economic growth.  
 
Lastly, this chapter considers the significant negative impact of tax evasion and tax 
corruption on an economy. The next chapter explores the literature available in relation to 
BEPS.  




CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW OF PROFIT SHIFTING 
 
3.1 Introduction   
This literature review explores the existing literature on the occurrence of BEPS. It begins 
with an overview of the key concepts and their existence in the real world and then 
provides further details on the real-world impact of these phenomena. Finally, this chapter 
discusses potential countermeasures which could be employed in response to these 
occurrences.  
 
3.2 Profit Shifting and Transfer Pricing  
A definition of profit shifting was provided in the preceding chapter. Another good 
explanation of profit shifting by MNEs is given by Hong (2010), “Multinational corporations 
may apply tax-planning strategies in order to shift their pre-tax profits from a high-tax 
country to a low-tax country; therefore, the same amount of money would be subject to a 
lower tax rate. By doing so, multinational corporations minimise their global tax liabilities 
without changing their total income.” 
 
As explained, profit shifting can occur through the pricing of transactions between 
members of an MNE or “transfer pricing”. The term “transfer pricing” refers to the setting 
of prices of transactions, which occur between associated enterprises, which form part of 
an MNE group. These transactions could involve the transfer of tangible or intangible 
property or services between the associated enterprises (United Nations Tax Committee's 
Subcommittee, 2011). Transfer mispricing involves setting the price of the aforementioned 
transactions so as to shift profits to more attractive regions.  
 
It should be noted that transfer pricing is normal within an MNE and entities within a group 
are required to transact with one another in order to run their business model successfully 
and benefit from value creation at different points in the value chain by different entities 
located in different regions including tax havens for various commercially sound reasons. 
An importance concept in this regard is that of “economic substance” which is achieved 
by performing functions, controlling assets and assuming risks in a jurisdiction (Singh & 
Mathur, 2017). It is completely acceptable to report high profits in a tax haven if economic 
substance exists in that jurisdiction. Therefore, transfer pricing in itself is not a 




acceptable terms and at appropriate prices. It is the act of transfer mispricing, or transfer 
pricing abuse, that is problematic because it results in profit shifting.  
 
Over the years, transfer mispricing has been identified as one of the most common ways 
in which profits are shifted, according to sources such as Desai et al. (2004), Foley et al. 
(2006), Dischinger & Riedel (2011), Buettner et al. (2012), Karkinsky & Riedel (2012), 
Heckemeyer & Overesch (2013) and Dharmapala (2014).  
 
Clausing (2000) provides a model, which explains transfer (mis)pricing on the basis that 
MNE’s have the incentive to shift profits between countries by under-pricing 
goods/services sold to group entities in low-tax countries and overpricing goods/services 
sold by group entities in low-tax countries, and vice versa. This would result in related 
party trade flows to (from) low-tax country affiliates being low (high) relative to intrafirm 
trade flows to (from) high-tax country affiliates, ceteris paribus6. The model is set forth 
below.  
 
The model considers an MNE, which operates in two countries that produces and sells 
goods/services in each country, and also exports part of the goods produced in the home 
country (Equation 3.1) to the offshore affiliate (Equation 3.2). The model initially assumes 
that the affiliate is fully owned. 
 
Profit functions for operations in the two countries are given by the following equations: 
 
 𝜋1 =  𝑅1(𝑠1) −  𝐶1(𝑠1 +  𝑚) +  𝑝𝑚  
 
Equation 3.1  
 
 𝜋2 =  𝑅2(𝑠2) − 𝐶2(𝑠2 −  𝑚) −  𝑝𝑚 Equation 3.2  
 
where 𝜋1 is profit in the home country, which depends on revenues, 𝑅1, that are a function 
of sales, 𝑠1, and costs, 𝐶1, that are a function of production. 
 
Production includes both goods sold at home and those sent to the offshore affiliate, 𝑚.  
                                                          
 




The output that is exported to the offshore affiliate is given the transfer price, 𝑝. 
 
The model considers that tax rates at home are greater than tax rates abroad, 𝑡1 >  𝑡2,  
and deferral is allowed. 𝑓 represents the fraction of profits that are repatriated. Then the 




𝑒 =  𝑡2 + (𝑡1 − 𝑡2)𝑓 Equation 3.3  
 
The net profit function for the firm’s global operations is given by the following equation.  
 
 𝜋 =  (1 − 𝑡1)𝜋1 + (1 − 𝑡2
𝑒)𝜋2 Equation 3.4  
 
To illustrate how the firm may choose a transfer price in order to maximize these net 
profits, the model considers the derivative of Equation 3.4 with respect to the transfer 
price, 𝑝. 
 
 𝜋𝑝 =  (1 − 𝑡1)𝑚 − (1 − 𝑡2
𝑒)𝑚 Equation 3.5  
 
Substituting for 𝑡2
𝑒, using equation (3.3) and rearranging,  
 
 𝜋𝑝 =  −(𝑡1 − 𝑡2)(1 −  𝑓)𝑚 Equation 3.6  
 
So, if 𝑡1 >  𝑡2, the previous expression is negative, and the firm’s net profits decrease with 
the transfer price.  
 
Clausing (2000), thus concludes that firms have an incentive to under-price goods sold to 
low-tax countries in order to shift profits to low-tax locations. Similarly, it is concluded that 
firms have an incentive to overprice goods sold to high-tax affiliates whenever 𝑡2 >  𝑡1, 
Therefore, Clausing’s (2000) analysis implies that firms will want to charge the lowest 





Due to transfer mispricing, the income earned or reported by each group entity is 
disproportionate to their relative economic contributions, which impacts the relevant tax 
jurisdictions’ fair share of tax (Makola, 2003).  
 
3.3 Historical occurrence of profit shifting   
It has already been established that profits shifting exists. However, this is not a new 
discovery; profit shifting is not a recent occurrence. In fact, economic literature has, for 
quite some time, been providing more and more evidence that profit shifting occurs and 
that multinational entities deliberately set up affiliate companies in low tax regions and 
either transfer income to or limit expenses for these affiliate companies with an aim to 
reduce the group’s overall tax bill (Hines, 1999). 
 
A 2006 study of United States of America (U.S.) MNEs by Bernard, Jensen and Schott 
found that the prices U.S. exporting companies set for their arm’s-length customers were 
much higher than the prices set for their related-parties (i.e. the prices to related parties 
were not arm’s length) (Bernard , et al., 2006).  
 
Devereux and Ma found, in their 2003 study that “differences in statutory tax rates appear 
to play a significant role in the location of taxable income; there is evidence that such 
differences affect financial policy, the repatriation of income and transfer prices” 
(Devereux & Ma, 2006). In addition, the 2014 study by Dhammika Dharmapala surveys 
the empirical literature in this regard (Dharmapala, 2014).  
 
There have also been significant studies, which consider the magnitude of the losses 
faced as a result of profit shifting. The literature provides abundant evidence for the 
presence of profit shifting resulting from transfer pricing. According to a review of the 
empirical literature on international tax avoidance by MNE’s, “Earlier empirical studies 
show that at the aggregate level, differences in the statutory corporate tax rate between 
the U.S. and its trading partners substantially influence the balance and pattern of intra-
firm trade in the U.S. (Clausing, 2001, 2006). Later studies provide more direct evidence, 
showing that the price wedge between the arm's-length price for unrelated transactions 
and the transfer price for related-party transactions varies systematically with corporate 
tax rate differentials faced by MNEs in the U.S. (Clausing, 2003; Bernard et al, 2006; 




Germany (Hebous and Johannesen, 2015), and the UK (Liu et al, 2017)”, (Beer, et al., 
2018). 
 
Another study performed by Beer and Loeprick found that that profit shifting in the oil and 
gas sector had effects on revenue amounting to a reduction of the CIT base of between 
12% up to 35% (Beer & Loeprick, 2015).  
 
Studies also exist, which consider the issue of international tax avoidance for developing 
countries specifically. A 2017 study by Johannesen, Torslov, and Wier, purports that 
“While almost all of the empirical evidence on profit shifting concerns developed countries, 
the problem may be even more acute in developing countries.” The study developed a 
new technique to detect cross-border profit shifting and took into account, certain issues 
that arise in the context of developing economies. The study applied the techniques to a 
global firm dataset (using the Bureau van Dijk Orbis Global Database) with a fair coverage 
in developing countries. The study showed that the tested firm’s tendency to shift profits 
varied with economic and institutional development. Less developed countries appeared 
to be more exposed to profit shifting and overall tax avoidance by MNE’s. The negative 
relationship found between a country’s level of development and its exposure to MNE’s 
international tax avoidance appeared in a wide array of empirical specifications 
(Johannesen, et al., 2017). The findings of the study were consistent with the wider view 
that developing countries have relatively lower fiscal capabilities (Besley & Persson, 
2013).  
 
In addition, the first direct evidence of profit shifting through transfer mispricing specifically 
in a developing country was detailed in a recent study, which used South African customs 
import data at a transaction level to directly test for deviations between the arm’s-length 
prices and the actual transfer prices. The study found that South African taxpayers who 
engage in importing transactions with their related cross-border counterparts do so at 
inflated prices. Therefore, the MNE group (either South African or foreign) manipulates 
transfer prices so as to shift taxable profits away from South Africa and toward low-tax 
countries. The estimated tax loss was found to be 0.5 percent of corporate tax payments 





3.4 Impact on developing countries  
In general, there is a common view that profit shifting poses a definite threat to developing 
countries’ revenue collection ability. Developing countries have been more prone to profit 
shifting due to their lack of sufficient and effective legislative and administrative resources 
(Riedel & Fuest, 2010) and (OECD, 2014). A study by Beer and Loeprick in 2015 also 
found that “less developed economies are more vulnerable to profit shifting” in the oil and 
gas sector (Beer & Loeprick, 2015).  
 
The increased occurrence of MNEs using complex structures and transfer mispricing to 
avoid tax in certain jurisdictions has led to losses in tax revenues for affected countries 
and that has resulted in economic challenges for developing countries, which suffer from 
resource constraints (Munyadziwa, et al., 2017). 
 
From a South African perspective, the economic conditions mean that there is a dire need 
for resources and revenues and the South African Revenue Service (SARS) has become 
increasingly concerned about the topic of BEPS and transfer pricing. 
 
3.5 Estimated losses due to illicit flows (including profit shifting) 
At the time of finalizing the BEPS reports, estimates indicated that global CIT revenue net 
losses were between USD 200 to USD 240 Billion per year. These losses were thought 
to be due to a number of causes including aggressive tax planning by some MNE Groups, 
lack of transparency and coordination between tax administration and limited country 
enforcement resources and harmful tax practices (OECD, 2015). Furthermore, estimates 
of the impact of BEPS on developing countries, as a percentage of tax revenues, were 
higher than in developed countries due to the fact that developing countries place high 
greater reliance on CIT revenues than developed countries. As a result, according to the 
OECD, the continuance of profit shifting and the harmful activities that lead to it would 
have a disproportionately harmful impact on developing countries. Apart from the reliance 
on corporate tax revenues, less-developed countries suffer more significant tax revenue 
losses due to transfer pricing abuses owing to the lack of sufficient administrative capacity 
to detect such abuses in these countries (Irish, 1986).  
 
Baker (2005) also stated that “illicit offshore transfers damage poorer countries, 
regardless of any other economic factors”. This is due to specific circumstances of poorer 




requirements. The resource needs of African countries for social services, infrastructure 
and investment underpin the importance of curbing illicit financial flows from Africa (High 
Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, 2016).  
 
The losses due to illicit flows as a result of transfer mispricing have been analysed for 
many years. Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2008) conducted a study to estimate the volume 
of illicit financial flows and associated trends from developing countries. Through a 
process of testing various combinations of models and by using a filter to eliminate 
ambiguous data, the study found that illicit financial flows are growing in volume on a 
yearly basis based on estimates of the period 2002 through 2006 (Kar & Cartwright-Smith, 
2008).  
 
Baker (2005) divides illicit financial flows into three main categories: “(i) commercial tax 
evasion, trade mis-invoicing and abusive transfer pricing, (ii) criminal activities, including 
the drug trade, human trafficking, illegal arms dealing and smuggling of contraband; and 
(iii) bribery and theft by corrupt government officials”. An estimate by Baker (2005) found 
that commercial illicit flows constituted the largest illicit flows with abusive transfer pricing 
accounting for half of the commercial estimate.  
 
In 2010, Dev Kar and Devon Cartwright-Smith conducted another study, which examined 
Africa in particular and the 39 year period from 1970 to 2008. The study utilized economic 
models including the World Bank Residual Method and IMF Direction of Trade Statistics 
and estimated that illicit financial flows from Africa to the rest of the world totalled USD854 
billion across the 39 year period and USD1.8 trillion when adjustments are made to take 
into account additional components (Kar & Cartwright-Smith, 2010). According to a report 
prepared by the High Level Panel on Illicit Financial Flows, this sum is approximately 
equivalent to the entire official development assistance received by Africa during that time. 
The report goes on to explain that Africa is estimated to be losing more than USD50 billion 
annually in illicit financial flows and these figures may be underestimated since accurate 
data does not exist for all African countries, and the estimates may likely exclude certain 
forms of non-disclosed flows due to illegal activities (High Level Panel on Illicit Financial 
Flows, 2016).  
 
A very recent study by Global Financial Integrity highlighted the point that trade-related 




advanced economies. Additionally, “trade mis-invoicing” was identified as the primary 
means for illicitly shifting funds and this remains an obstacle to achieving sustainable and 
equitable growth in the developing world (Global Financial Integrity, 2019). The report 
explained that “trade mis-invoicing” is accomplished by misstating the value or volume of 
an export or import on a customs invoice. The misstating of the value of the invoice is an 
example of transfer mispricing. The study only covered the mis-invoicing of goods trade 
and did not include any estimates on services trade due to a lack of data. However, the 
provision and receipt of services is a fast-growing and increasingly significant component 
of intra group activities and world trade. Therefore, Global Financial Integrity believes the 
estimates of illicit flows in its report may be understated. The study highlighted results 
using two different datasets, namely, (1) the Direction of Trade Statistics dataset from the 
IMF and (2) the Comtrade dataset from the United Nations. Using the former, illicit flows 
for South Africa were found to be USD10.2 billion and using the latter USD5.9 billion for 
the ten year period 2006 through 2015. Although each dataset presented quote different 
final outcomes, the results are significant for South Africa in either case.  
 
3.6 OECD Countermeasures  
In order to counter transfer mispricing and resultant profit shifting, the OECD prepared the 
original version of a report entitled Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises in 1979 
(OECD, 1979). This report set forth certain guidelines, which MNEs should follow in order 
to ensure that their pricing activities did not bring about BEPS. The original version of the 
report was approved by the Committee on Fiscal Affairs on 27 June 1995 and by the 
OECD Council for publication on 13 July 1995. These guidelines have been revised 
numerous times since their initial preparation, the latest update being finalised during July 
2017 (OECD, 2017).  
 
The latest update of the OECD Guidelines was done following the finalisation of the 
majority of the BEPS project which started in 2013. The BEPS project came as a result of 
the identification of international tax issues by political leaders around the world as a 
serious concern due to the increase in the integration of national economies and markets. 
According to Cristea & Nguyen (2016), “concerns over tax avoidance have intensified so 
much in recent years that international taxation regulation has become a top priority on 
the agenda of the OECD and G8 country meetings”. The rationale behind the BEPS 
project was that the integration had strained the existing international tax framework and 




there is also more awareness around international tax competition and the potential 
effects this may have on countries (Crivelli, et al., 2015).   
 
Most of the BEPS reports were finalised in 2015 and 2016. However, some are still being 
considered in the current context, for example the report dealing with taxation in the digital 
economy (Herve & Starkov, 2019). The reports included new or revised standards and 
measures to help countries tackle BEPS due to the increased awareness around and 
seemingly intensifying nature of the BEPS problem. The 13 reports include 15 actions, 
which aim to equip governments with domestic and international tools, which can be used 
to tackle tax avoidance and ensure that profits are taxed in the location where the 
economic activities that generated these profits were performed and where value was 
created (OECD, 2018). The action plan also includes specific actions (11 through 13), 
which are aimed at enhancing the disclosure of tax-related information. Action 13 
particularly addresses the issue of transfer pricing documentation. In addition, actions 8 
through 10 focus specifically on transfer pricing. The OECD website states “Actions 8 – 
10 contain transfer pricing guidance to assure that transfer pricing outcomes are in line 
with value creation in relation to intangibles, including hard-to-value ones, to risks and 
capital, and to other high-risk transactions.” Actions 8 – 10 are aimed at aligning transfer 
pricing outcomes with value creation.  
 
Economic and value creating activities are those that drive a business and generate 
profits. The BEPS actions were developed on the basis that profits should be achieved 
(and taxed) where these activities occur. On the other hand, where there are no economic 
and value creating activities taking place, profits should be limited (in comparison to the 
former scenario). This is due to the fact that the tactic MNE’s often use is to report high 
profits in low tax jurisdictions in order to minimise their tax burden even though there are 
no significant business activities in that country and report low profits in high tax 
jurisdictions where there are significant ongoing business activities and value is being 
created. This method of shifting profits means that tax revenue is not reported in the 
jurisdiction where resources are used to create value, which should be the case.  
 
The finalised action points have been implemented through their integration into the 
OECD guidelines as well as through specific legislation being passed in certain countries 
based on the action points. The core aspect of the OECD guidelines is the separate entity 




way in which to approach transfer pricing since it is thought to result in equitable results 
for the MNE (reducing double taxation) and for the country’s tax administration (reducing 
profit shifting). The OECD Guidelines aim to balance the interests of taxpayers (MNEs) 
and tax administrations (OECD, 2017).  
 
The fundamental principle embodied by the OECD Guidelines is the Arm’s length 
principle, which stipulates that the transactions between MNE group members should be 
conducted under similar terms, conditions and prices as would have been agreed upon 
had the group members been independent parties. The arm’s length principle is 
underpinned by the concept of transactions occurring as they would on the open market. 
Therefore, the principle is, primarily, an economic concept (Herve & Starkov, 2019).   
 
Article 9 of the OECD Model Tax Conventions states: "[When] conditions are made or 
imposed between ... two [associated] enterprises in their commercial or financial relations 
which differ from those which would be made between independent enterprises, then any 
profits which would, but for those conditions, have accrued to one of the enterprises, but, 
by reason of those conditions, have not so accrued, may be included in the profits of that 
enterprise and taxed accordingly" (OECD , 2003).  
 
The OECD states the following on the arm’s length principle: “the arm’s length principle 
follows the approach of treating the members of an MNE group as operating as separate 
entities rather than as inseparable parts of a single unified business. Because the separate 
entity approach treats the members of an MNE group as if they were independent entities, 
attention is focused on the nature of the transactions between those members and on 
whether the conditions thereof differ from the conditions that would be obtained in 
comparable uncontrolled transactions” (OECD, 2017).  
 
3.7 The need for further countermeasures   
Although the OECD Guidelines were put in place and the BEPS reports released, the 
OECD is not a law-making body and the guidelines did not have the status of law. Neither 
national tax administrations nor taxpayers are bound by the OECD Guidelines. The 
guidelines can be viewed as “soft law” (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public 
Finance, 2012). The term “soft law” in the international taxation context can be used to 
describe a “quasi-legal instrument”, which is not legally binding, but is intended to directly 




that requires any two countries to enter into bilateral tax treaties with one another or 
cooperate regarding which country should receive the tax income, the OECD guidelines 
are of utmost importance in bridging that gap and providing practical guidance. However, 
even though the Guidelines are thought to be quite powerful, they need to be translated 
into “hard law” through domestic legislation, or tax treaties, in order to produce the desired 
effects (Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance, 2012).  
 
Therefore, although the BEPS project had a massive impact on BEPS, an increasing 
number of governments are introducing and increasing transfer pricing regulations in order 
to convert “soft law” to “hard law” in order to curb profit shifting (Lohse, et al., 2012).  
 
3.8 The need for policy as a countermeasure  
In CESIFO Working Paper No.4975, a model is constructed to determine how an MNE 
will behave given different types of government action. It is found that, based on the model, 
a government increase in efforts to detect transfer mispricing has an unclear effect on 
profit shifting. On the other hand, improving and extending transfer pricing regulations 
(e.g. by making transfer pricing documentation a compliance requirement), results in a 
reduction in profit shifting (Nielsen, et al., 2014). Furthermore, according to Heckemeyer 
& Overesch (2013), policy makers need to restrict transfer mispricing if they want to be 
effective in restricting profit shifting activities. Global Financial Integrity also advised that 
governments and international organizations strengthen policy and increase cooperation 
to combat illicit flows (Global Financial Integrity, 2019). 
 
Baker (2005) also explains that the answer to reducing abusive transfer pricing is simply 
that honesty is required in pricing. This appears to translate into a need for transparency 
in pricing, which can be achieved through the implementation of transfer pricing 
documentation as a compliance requirement.  
 
3.9 Tax administration  
Developing countries need to have sound tax administrations in place in order to benefit 
from globalisation or to recover from or prevent damages to their fiscus. A sound and 
stable tax administration is needed so as to mobilise adequate fiscal revenues (Bird, 
2014). However, improving tax administration capabilities in developing countries remains 





According to Bird (2014), the revenue production process requires a particular set of 
resources including properly skilled and trained staff, sufficient infrastructure and 
equipment, and proficient managerial input. However, these particular resources are 
considered scarce in many developing countries including South Africa.  
 
Operating the complex tax revenue production process effectively in a complex 
environment poses some difficulties. There are three key aspects, which are considered 
vital for effective tax administration in a country – these are, the political will to implement 
the tax system effectively, a clear strategy regarding how to implement the tax system, 
and adequate resources in order to complete the implementation. Even the most well 
designed tax system that is simple and appropriate for a particular country will only work 
if these three conditions are met (Bird & de Jantscher, 1992).  
 
It should be noted that while a large focus is placed on the resources issue, a sound 
implementation strategy is required in order to mobilise these resources. Furthermore, 
even the soundest strategy cannot be effectively implemented in the absence of sufficient 
political support. It is key that in order to have an effective tax administration, the 
administration must clearly recognise the importance of the task and the highest 
authorities must be willing to support good administrative practices (Bird, 2014).  
 
Once the key aspect of political support is achieved, the resources can be considered. 
The tax administration should be adequately staffed with trained officials; it should be 
properly organised and should be well equipped with the appropriate technology so as to 
assist in the gathering, storage and application of useful and necessary information, in 
order to make administering taxes an efficient process. It is necessary to find the 
appropriate mix of resources in order for the tax administration to be effective. Overall, 
well-trained people, with adequate political support, are needed to manage and effect a 
tax system (Bird, 2014).  
 
3.10 Conclusion  
This chapter provided further insight into the BEPS phenomenon and explained that one 
of the major ways in which BEPS occurs is through transfer pricing – i.e. the way in which 





In terms of exploring the occurrence of BEPS and transfer pricing, this chapter considered 
literature that provides evidence that profit shifting, and profit shifting through transfer 
pricing specifically, is a real-life observed occurrence.  
 
Furthermore, the impact on developing countries was considered specifically, as this 
provides meaningful implications in the South African context. In addition, literature 
evidencing the magnitude of illicit flows was explored so as to depict the enormity of the 
problem in real monetary terms.   
 
Finally, this chapter considered possible countermeasures for BEPS as well as why these 
are necessary and important. Policy as a countermeasure was considered specifically, as 
well as the importance of the tax administration whenever policy is concerned.  
 
The next chapter provides further statistical information on CIT in South Africa and 




CHAPTER 4: CORPORATE INCOME TAX POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
4.1. Introduction   
This chapter starts by summarising the effects of globalisation explained in previous 
sections before providing further details on relevant tax statistics and highlighting the 
importance of CIT revenues in the South African context. The chapter then goes on to 
describe the relevant CIT and transfer pricing policies that exist in South Africa, which 
aims to address the issue of BEPS. Finally, the chapter contains references to the relevant 
studies, which have been performed by other researchers, which sought to consider the 
impact of policy on BEPS.  
 
4.2. The effect of globalisation  
As explained in prior sections, globalisation is thought to be a significant contributing factor 
to intensification of profit shifting (Liu, et al., 2017). However, globalisation is also required 
for developing countries to grow as it is seen as a significant contributor to FDI in 
developing countries (Worasinchai & Bechina, 2010). MNEs are thought to contribute to 
economic growth and overall wellbeing in developing countries as they assist in job 
creation and, as a result, provide increased buying power to the residents of that country. 
This leads to “increased tax revenue, increased exports, improved infrastructure and 
significant technological advancements” (Worasinchai & Bechina, 2010). Therefore, 
developing countries are inclined to safeguard their tax bases while still ensuring that FDI 
into their countries are not discouraged or prevented (Silberztein, 2009).  
 
4.3. Tax revenue statistics  
As explained in preceding sections, tax revenues are an important source of income for 
all countries and developing countries specifically.  
 
4.3.1. Tax-to-GDP ratio 
As explained in Chapter 1, the OECD published a report on the revenue statistics in 
Africa in 2018. The report showed that South Africa had a high and increasing tax-to-
GDP ratio, which is an indication that South Africa relies on its tax revenues to provide 
public services.  
 
However, it is worth noting, that the interpretation of the tax-to-GDP ratio needs to be 




taxpayers receive many public services would not be considered in a negative light – 
in this case a high tax burden is unlikely to be harmful. Many countries such as 
Denmark, Sweden and Finland have high tax-to-GDP ratios, but also report some of 
the highest standards of living in the world due to the public services they receive. In 
contrast, a very low tax-to-GDP ratio could be indicative of an unproductive tax system. 
If a government is not able to collect taxes when possible, it will not have the revenue 
required to provide public goods, services and infrastructure (Stats SA, 2019).   
 
4.3.2. Tax Structure  
South Africa’s tax structure compared with that of other regions is shown below.   
 




Another dataset published by Stats SA’s financial statistics of national government 
report shows that personal income tax contributed over a third of the R1.22 trillion in 
taxes collected by national government in the 2017/18 fiscal year7.  
 
Personal income taxes were the largest contributor to tax revenues, value added tax 
(VAT), the second and CIT followed next and was the third largest contributor to tax 
revenues in South Africa.  
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Figure 5: Contributions of different tax types to the total South African tax 
revenue for 2018 (Stats SA, 2019) (Author’s compilation)  
 
 
According to Stats SA (2019), tax revenue has been growing steadily, despite weak 
economic growth. 
 
4.4. South Africa’s transfer pricing legislative landscape  
Governments cannot develop a tax system and rely solely on taxpayers’ sense of duty to 
follow the system. Therefore, following a tax system is required to be the legal 
responsibility of residents, with penalties resulting from noncompliance in order to ensure 
compliance (Slemrod, 2007). 
 
South Africa, although not a member OECD country, has followed the OECD Guidelines 
since the introduction of SARS Practice Note: No. 7 – 6 August 1999 (PN 7), paragraph 
3.2.1. In addition, the concept of transfer pricing is considered under South African tax 
legislation under Section 31 of the Income Tax Act No. 58 of 1962 (the Income Tax Act).  
 
Section 31 of the Income Tax Act states that “tax payable in respect of international 
transactions to be based on arm’s length principle”. Section 31 was introduced into the 
Act in 1995 (South African Revenue Services, 1999). When transfer prices do not adhere 
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While South Africa has had transfer pricing legislation in place for some time in terms of 
the above, a critical change in the landscape occurred with effect from 1 April 2012. 
Effectively, the scope of transfer pricing was broadened to include the principle that not 
only should the price of the transaction be arm’s length but the overall arrangement 
including its terms and conditions should also follow the arm’s length principle.  
 
Furthermore, the onus of proof has also been shifted from the commissioner to the 
taxpayer. This means that the commissioner no longer has to prove that a transaction is 
not arm’s length, rather the taxpayer is obliged to demonstrate that a transaction is arm’s 
length. In addition, where transfer pricing adjustments are required, a taxpayer must make 
any transfer pricing adjustments that might be required by itself when it calculates its 
taxable income (Davis Tax Committee, 2016) 
 
In 2013, the South African Minister of Finance established the Davis Tax Committee 
(DTC). The committee’s aim was to inquire into the role of the tax system in encouraging 
inclusive economic growth, employment creation, development and fiscal sustainability 
(South African Government , 2019). One of the key focus areas for the DTC was BEPS 
and the DTC issued two reports in this regard in which recommendations were provided 
in relation to the BEPS action points (amongst other things). Part of the recommendations 
provided included guidance on the designing of tax rules to prevent BEPS. According to 
their report, such rules comply with the principles of a good tax system which are: equity, 
efficiency, certainty and simplicity (Davis Tax Committee, 2016).  
 
Following the release of the BEPS final reports and the setup of the DTC, the legislation 
was extended during 2016 and 2017 through the following releases in order to legally 
implement the BEPS action points in South Africa (South African Revenue Services, 
2018):  
a. SARS Notice: Duty to keep the records, books of account or documents in terms 
of Section 29 of the Tax Administration Act, 2011 – 28 October 2016  
b. SARS Notice: REGULATIONS FOR PURPOSES OF PARAGRAPH (b) OF THE 
DEFINITION OF “INTERNATIONAL TAX STANDARD” IN SECTION 1 OF THE 
TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT, 2011 (ACT NO. 28 OF 2011), PROMULGATED 




COUNTRY BY- COUNTRY REPORTING STANDARD FOR MULTINATIONAL 
ENTERPRISES – 23 December 2016 
c. SARS Notice: RETURN TO BE SUBMITTED BY PERSONS IN TERMS OF 
SECTION 25 OF THE TAX ADMINISTRATION ACT, 2011 (ACT NO. 28 OF 
2011) – 20 October 2017 
d. SARS External Business Requirements Specification: Country- by- Country and 
Financial Data Reporting - 2017 
 
The notices above have effectively implemented BEPS Action Plan 13, through the 
implementation of the three-tiered approach to transfer pricing documentation. South 
African taxpayers who form part of an MNE and who meet certain thresholds are required 
to prepare and submit the following documents:  
a. A Country by Country Report (CbCR): this report summarises certain key financial 
and commercial information of the entire group by country. Therefore, SARS is 
able to have an overall view of the profits reported and tax paid in every country 
in relation to the activity in the country. This report is thought to serve the purpose 
of detecting abusive tax arrangements. 
b. The Master File: this document is a summary of the operations and transfer 
pricing policies in place within the entire group. The master file is required to 
contain specific information such as the group’s organisational structure, a written 
description of the multinational’s business, a description of the multinational’s 
intangibles, a description of the multinational’s intercompany financing activities 
and a summary of the multinational’s financial and tax positions. It is essentially, 
a blueprint of the Group’s business and would provide further detail on what was 
shown numerically in the CbCR.   
c. The Local File: this is a detailed transfer pricing report for the South African entity, 
which explains, in detail, what the transfer pricing policies are per inter-company 
transaction and whether the policies were applied correctly. The document also 
contains extremely detailed analyses explaining whether/why these policies are 
arm’s length. This document would be read with the master file in order to see 
how the detailed entity information fits in with the wider group.  
d. In addition to the above, a South African taxpayer meeting certain thresholds is 
also now required to keep significant additional records to support its related party 
transactions and is required to submit this information immediately if requested 




e. Lastly, the South African Income Tax Return for companies (ITR14) was 
amended on a few occasions to include additional specific transfer pricing and 
CbCR questions to be answered annually.  
 
The steps taken above to make transfer pricing documentation a matter of compliance, 
aim to create transparency of MNE’s activities and should highlight to tax authorities 
instances where MNE’s report taxable profits that are inconsistent with the economic value 
created in a particular country. It should be noted that the rules above were effective for 
some South African companies from 2016; however, for most South African companies, 
the rules became effective in 2017. The extensive legislation that has been introduced is 
in line with the legislation in effect in many developed countries (Reynolds & Wier, 2016).  
 
The improvement of transfer pricing legislation is thought to be the answer to curbing the 
profit shifting issue. According to Evers et al. (2016), “since current tax planning activities 
are mainly based on the legal exploitation of gaps and loopholes in national and 
international tax law…. tax legislators should limit profit shifting by enforcing tax rules and 
by closing gaps in tax law. In particular (through) more tightened and standardized transfer 
pricing regulations and thin-cap rules (which should) be adopted…”. Dharmapala (2014) 
also purported that legal and economic policy are required as constraints for BEPS.  
 
However, despite the extensive literature available on profit shifting and its reach and 
magnitude, there have only been a few studies performed in order to consider the impact 
of policy on profit shifting.  
 
A study that considered policy was performed by Rathke in 2015. The analysis shows that 
domestic taxation of foreign profits could potentially reduce the incentive for transfer 
mispricing (through controlled foreign company (CFC) rules). Although broadly applied, 
the limited tax credit rule (when tax credits for foreign taxes paid abroad are allowed in the 
home country, but are limited to the home taxation of foreign profits) could also reduce 
mispricing incentive but less efficiently than other residence-based rules analysed. Ad 
valorem (proportionate) tariffs on imports may also lead to reduced manipulation. Their 
model provided insight into the influences of tax enforcement and market parameters on 
the transfer pricing incentive. The model found that tax enforcement (use of policy) was a 
viable method for discouraging transfer mispricing. The findings also suggested that 




volatile or if market activity does not provide an accurate view of an accepted arm’s length 
price range (Rathke , 2015).  
 
Another study performed by Beer and Loeprick confirmed earlier findings on the 
contribution of legislative transfer pricing documentation requirements in countering 
international transfer-mispricing (Beer & Loeprick, 2015).  
 
The most important study identified is a study conducted by Riedel et al (2015). This study 
is entitled “Do Transfer Pricing Laws Limit International Income Shifting? Evidence from 
European Multinationals”. The study empirically investigates whether transfer pricing laws 
actually restrict profit shifting behaviour. In line with previous studies, the study found 
additional evidence for tax-driven profit shifting and further suggested that transfer pricing 
regulations decrease profit shifting activities. The results of the study are economically 
relevant since they suggest that the adoption of transfer pricing regulations results in a 
positive economic effect notwithstanding the high administrative burden the regulations 
impose on firms and tax authorities (Riedel, et al., 2015). The results of the study show 
that profit shifting has declined rather than grown during the sample period 1999-2009, 
which is consistent with the expectation that the introduction and implementation of 
transfer pricing rules in the sample countries has reduced profit shifting (Dharmapala, 
2014).  
 
Another important study was performed by Katharina Nicolay, Hannah Nusser and Olena 
Pfeiffer in 2017 and was based on the Riedel et al. (2015) study above but also 
incorporated thin capitalisation legislation into the model (Nicolay, et al., 2017). This study 
confirmed the existing empirical evidence that more stringent transfer pricing regulations 
reduced profit shifting. Similarly, this study also considered only European countries. 
 
A significant study that did consider a developing country was performed by Wier (2018) 
and utilised South African customs data to consider the OECD reform on South African 
companies specifically as an indicator for developing countries. The study found that that 
the “OECD-recommended reform had no long-term impact on transfer mispricing”. 
However, the study considered OECD reform only until the 2012 change in legislation and 
did not consider the 2016/2017 change, which made transfer pricing documentation 
compulsory in South Africa. Wier found that transfer mispricing fell in the immediate 




purported that companies’ fear of higher audit risk led to the initial response of a reduction 
in transfer mispricing. However, once it became clear that the tax authority did not increase 
its enforcement efforts, the effect of the reform disappeared. 
 
Prior to the study performed by Riedel et al. (2015), the significant studies in relation to 
the effect of policy on profit shifting were those performed by Overesch & Wamser (2010), 
Buettner et al. (2012), and Blouin et al. (2014).  Each of these studies found that MNE 
Group debt shifting behaviour is reduced by the introduction of thin capitalisation 
rules/regulations, which restricts the deductibility of interest from taxable income.  
 
4.5. Conclusion  
This chapter provided detail on the significance of CITs in South Africa and detailed the 
CIT policy in South Africa, which is aimed at addressing BEPS.  
 
The study then went on to detail and reference studies that have been performed by other 
researchers, which sought to consider the impact of policy on BEPS. However, it is noted 
that there are only a few studies which consider transfer pricing regulations or policy 
specifically and the effect that the introduction of such policy may have on developing 
economies in particular.  
 
As mentioned, the Riedel et al. (2015) study is the most crucial study found in the research 
available pertaining to the aforementioned research questions and hypothesis. However, 
this research focuses specifically on European countries rather than developing countries 
such as South Africa. Similarly, the 2017 study by Nicolay, Nusser and Pfeiffer also 
focussed on European countries. While the Wier (2018) study did consider a developing 
country (South Africa in particular), the study only considered the impact that the 2012 
change in Transfer Pricing legislation had on transfer mispricing.  
 
Developing countries face certain specific socio-economic issues including a lack of 
administrative capacity that may hinder the reduction of profit shifting even where 
regulations are stringent. According to Nhema (2016), developing countries do not have 
sufficiently well-coordinated administrative agencies and administrative reform is required. 
In addition, according to Rathke (2015), governments’ tax enforcement is required in order 
to restrain transfer pricing manipulation and profit shifting by influencing the effectiveness 




will have on profit shifting in developing countries like South Africa. The National Treasury 
(2019) acknowledged this uncertainty in its medium-term budget statement where it was 
expressed that although measures were taken to increase tax revenue, the expected 
increase in tax collections had fallen short of expectations due to inefficiencies and 
structural weaknesses at SARS. Despite the uncertainly, it is expected that the rules 
should lead to some level of decrease in profit shifting.  
 
The remainder of the research contained in this dissertation will attempt to fill the gap in 
literature by considering the impact of transfer pricing regulations on South Africa, a 
developing country. This research will provide an additional contribution compared with 
the Wier (2018) study because this study considers the impact of the tightening of transfer 
pricing rules in 2016 and 2017 in addition to the 2012 change considered by the initial 
study.   
 






CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
5.1. Introduction  
This chapter describes the research methodology utilised in performing the research 
study, including descriptions of the data collected, the method of analysis and the 
assumptions and expectations of the study.   
 
The key objective of the study is to examine the impact of transfer pricing legislation on 
the profit shifting behaviour of South African parented multinational enterprises. The study 
utilises publicly available financial data on South African MNE’s and employs econometric 
methodology and tools to determine the effect that the introduction of transfer pricing 
documentation rules have had on the South African earnings before interest and tax (EBIT 
or operating profit). In accounting and finance, EBIT is a measure of a firm's profit that 
includes all income and expenses (operating and non-operating) and excludes interest 
expenses and income tax expenses (Bodie, et al., 2004).  
 
5.2. Empirical Model 
The research study aimed to utilise an existing empirical model, developed and used by 
Riedel et al. (2015), to examine whether the newly tightened South African transfer pricing 
rules could limit profit shifting behaviour in South African MNEs.  
 
In their 2015 paper, Riedel et al. (2015) described the study undertaken as having the aim 
of investigating “whether transfer pricing rules that aim to limit tax-motivated multinational 
mis-pricing activities are effective in reducing profit shifting behaviour”. In order to conduct 
the study, information was collected on the scope and evolution of national transfer pricing 
regulations in Europe and was linked with extensive panel data on European MNE’s. The 
findings of Riedel et al. (2015) suggested that the introduction and tightening of transfer 
pricing rules raises (lowers) reported operating profits of high-tax (low-tax) MNE affiliates. 







Riedel et al. (2015) implemented an empirical model that tested the effects of introducing 
or tightening transfer pricing laws on multinational affiliates' reported EBIT/operating 
profits. Their model is specified in equation 5.1. below and explained directly below the 
specification:  
 
𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝜏𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝜏𝑖𝑡  . 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽3𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑗 + ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡  Equation 5.1.  
 
Left hand side shows the dependent variable 𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡: Natural log of earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT) of affiliate i in industry j at time t. Coefficients of the independent 
variables show the effect on EBIT as a percentage (due to the natural log)  
 
Right hand side shows the independent variables:  
𝛽: Coefficient  
𝜏𝑖𝑡: Host country’s corporate tax rate  
𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡: Dummy variable used to depict the presence of transfer pricing rules (dummy 
variables are discussed further below) 
𝜏𝑖𝑡 . 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡: Interaction term between corporate tax rate and transfer pricing rules (interaction 
terms are discussed further below)  
𝑋𝑖𝑡: Variable firm control variables 
𝜌𝑖𝑡: Industry fixed terms 
𝜑𝑖𝑗: Company fixed terms 
∈𝑖𝑗𝑡: Error term 
 
Riedel et al. (2015) hypothesised that “tighter transfer pricing laws raise (reduce) the pre-
tax profits reported by multinational affiliates in high-tax (low-tax) countries” i.e. the 
increase (decrease) in EBIT for high tax (low tax) is caused by a reduction in profit shifting.  
 
This model contributed to the growing literature on tax-motivated profit shifting by MNEs. 
While profit shifting strategies have been studied extensively, this study is one of only a 
few which consider the effectiveness of legislation aimed at limiting profit shifting. Other 
studies, which have considered the effect of legislations, include Overesch & Wamser 
(2010), Buettner et al. (2012) and Blouin et al. (2014) who evidenced that thin 
capitalization rules that restrict the deductibility of interest payments are effective in limiting 
multinational debt shifting behaviour. In addition, Ruf & Weichenrieder (2012), Ruf & 




company regulations are effective in reducing multinational (passive) investments in low-
tax jurisdictions. The study by Riedel et al. (2015) supplements the existing literature by 
illustrating that transfer pricing regulations are another effective legislative method for 
reducing profit shifting. 
 
5.3. Simplified Empirical Model  
In order to utilise the model to test South African panel data, the model required a few 
simple adjustments in order to allow for a logical analysis. Furthermore, a pragmatic 
approach was required in order to conduct the research study.  
 
The regression equation was estimated using the EViews 10 software (EViews). EViews 
is an econometric software package for use with time series, cross-section, or longitudinal 
(panel) data. EViews is used to manage data, perform econometric and statistical 
analysis, generate forecasts or model simulations, and produce high quality graphs and 
tables for publication or inclusion in other applications (EViews, 2019). 
 
This approach taken to adapt the model for the application of South African panel data is 
described below.  
a) The corporate tax term was adjusted since all companies were South African, 
which meant that all host country corporate tax rates would be the same. 
Therefore, the term 𝜏𝑖𝑡 was adjusted to be the average foreign corporate tax rate 
of the group.  
b) The dummy 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 was indicated as 1 (to show the presence of transfer pricing 
rules) in three different scenarios, bearing in mind that transfer pricing rules have 
been presented in South African legislation since 1995. However, significant 
changes to legislation occurred in the following years:  
i. From 2012 through 2017 to indicate the 2012 change in transfer pricing 
legislation whereby the onus was then on the taxpayer to prove that 
intercompany transactions were priced at arm’s length (a detailed 
description of this legislation was provided in Chapter 4).  
ii. From 2016 through 2017 to indicate the initial implementation of transfer 
pricing legislation. Companies that had a CbCR requirement would also 
have had a compulsory transfer pricing documentation requirement from 




b. In 2017 only to indicate that most companies would have a compulsory transfer 
pricing documentation requirement from 2017 onward.   
c) 𝑋𝑖𝑡: Variable firm control variables including total assets, number of employees, 
turnover, interest cover ratio, stock turnover ratio, solvency ratio, total liabilities, 
ordinary dividends. These variables are discussed further in the next section.  
d) While the original model adjusted for fixed effects, it was determined that the fixed 
effects technique could not be employed for this particular dataset. Therefore, the 
random effects technique was considered. In general, to decide between a 
random effects and fixed effects model, researchers often rely on the Hausman 
(1978) specification test (Clark & Linzer, 2015). The null hypothesis is that the 
preferred model is random effects and the alternate hypothesis is that the model 
is fixed effects. A finding that the probability value (p) is less than 0.05 (p < 0.05) 
is taken as evidence that the two models are different enough to reject the null 
hypothesis, and hence to reject the random effects model in favour of the fixed 
effects model. A finding that the probability equals zero (p = 0) implies the random 
effects result is no different than the standard ordinary least squares (OLS) result.  
Note that in statistical hypothesis testing, the probability value is the probability of 
obtaining test results, which have been observed during the test, assuming that 
the null hypothesis is correct (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). 
e) In addition to the correlation identified by EViews, some of the firm data collected 
may be related due to being listed or unlisted companies or due to operating 
within the same or similar industries, which may result in correlated error terms 
or “contemporaneous correlation” (Carter Hill, et al., 2011). Therefore, the 
specification was also estimated using the seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) 
model to account for the correlation of the cross-section observations.  In 
econometrics, the Zellner (1962) model of seemingly unrelated regressions 
(SUR) is a generalisation of a linear regression model consisting of several 
regression equations where, in theory, each equation has its own dependent 
variable and explanatory variables. Each equation is a valid linear regression on 
its own and can be estimated separately, which is why the system is called 
“seemingly unrelated” as the equations appear to be unrelated but the error terms 
are actually correlated across the equations (Davidson & MacKinnon, 1993).   
f) The results of each of the different techniques were compared to determine which 
model was better suited to the data set. These estimation techniques are 





Following the adjustments, the simplified model is specified by Equation 5.2. as follows:  
 
𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝜏𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2(𝜏𝑖𝑡  . 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽3𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜌𝑖𝑡 + 𝜑𝑖𝑗 + ∈𝑖𝑗𝑡  Equation 5.2.  
 
The left-hand side shows the dependent variable 𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡: Natural log of earnings before 
interest and tax (EBIT) of affiliate i in industry j at time t. Coefficients of the independent 
variables show the effect on EBIT as a percentage (due to the natural log) 
 
Right hand side shows the independent variables: 
𝛽: Coefficient  
𝜏𝑖𝑡: Average group foreign corporate tax rate 
𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡: Dummy variable used to depict the presence of transfer pricing rules (dummy 
variables are discussed further in the following chapter) 
𝜏𝑖𝑡 . 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡:  Interaction term between corporate tax rate and transfer pricing rules (interaction 
terms are discussed further in the following chapter)  
𝑋𝑖𝑡: Variable firm control variables including total assets, number of employees, turnover, 
interest cover ratio, stock turnover ratio, solvency ratio, total liabilities, ordinary dividends 
 𝛿𝑖𝑗: Group/Company random effects / SUR weighting 
∈𝑖𝑗𝑡: Error term 
 
Note: the subscript it indicates the use of panel data, which is detailed in a section below.  
 
The expectations of the model are discussed in Chapter 6.  
 
5.4. Firm control variables  
The following variables were selected as firm control variables. Other variables are 
included to control for other factors that may affect profitability (Clausing, 2003). The 
control variables are related to the dependent variable and controlling for these variables 
allows for the consideration and interpretation of the transfer pricing effect on the 
dependent variable (Clausing, 2000). A description of each variable and how it 
corresponds with the dependent variable is provided below.  
 
a) Total assets: Total assets refers to the total amount of assets owned by an entity. 




in future economic benefits flowing to the entity originating from past events 
(Koppeschaar, et al., 2017). The economic value created by the assets is likely 
to be linked to the profitability of an entity.  
b) Number of employees: the number of employees an entity has alludes to the size 
of the operations of an entity and is likely to be linked to its profitability. 
c) Turnover: Turnover or revenue is the income that arises in the normal course of 
business and is representative of an inflow of economic benefits (Koppeschaar, 
et al., 2017). Therefore, turnover is linked to the profitability of an entity.  
d) Interest cover ratio: This ratio focusses on the number of times a company can 
cover its interest expense with its operating income. The higher the ratio, the 
better off a company is as it is better able to service its debt (Tyran, 1992). 
Therefore, the interest cover ratio is linked to the profitability of an entity. 
e) Stock turnover ratio: Stock or inventory turnover is a measure of an entity’s sales 
efficiency and measures the number of times inventory or stock is sold or used in 
a given time period such as one year (Tyran, 1992). Since gross profit is earned 
each time inventory is turned over, the stock turnover ratio is linked to the 
profitability of an entity. 
f) Solvency ratio: the solvency ratio is a ratio used to measure whether a company 
can meet its long term debts. The solvency ratio quantifies the company’s after-
tax profit, excluding non-cash expenses such as depreciation compared with the 
total debt obligations of the firm (Tyran, 1992). Therefore, the solvency ratio is 
linked to the profitability of an entity. 
g) Total liabilities: Total liabilities are the aggregate of the present obligations arising 
from past events, the settlement of which results in outflows of resource/economic 
benefits from the entity (Koppeschaar, et al., 2017). While assets create an 
economic value, liabilities may lead to an economic burden, which may be linked 
to the profitability of an entity. 
h) Ordinary dividends: Ordinary dividends are distributions made by the entity to the 
equity holders (shareholders) of the company (Koppeschaar, et al., 2017). The 
distributions made are determined by the availability of retained earnings. 
Retained earnings reflect the portion of equity that results from operational profits 
(Tyran, 1992). Since retained earnings are determined by profits, ordinary 





5.5. Use of panel data  
Baltagi (2005) defines the “term ‘panel data’ refers to the pooling of observations on a 
cross-section of households, countries, firms, etc. over several time periods”. A 
longitudinal or panel set of data is a dataset that follows a given sample of a cross section 
over time, thereby providing multiple observations on each individual in the cross section 
(Hsiao, 2003).  
 
There are number of reasons why panel data should be used according to Hsiao (2003) 
and Klevmarken (1989), such as:  
a) To control for heterogeneity. Panel data advocates that individuals, firms, states 
or countries are heterogeneous or diverse. Time-series and cross-section studies 
that do not control for his heterogeneity run the risk of obtaining biased results 
due to this diversity.  
b) Panel data is better able to study the dynamics of adjustments. Cross-sectional 
distributions that appear to be stable may actually hide many changes, which can 
only be seen over time. 
c) Panel data is better able to identify and measure effects that are not noticeable in 
cross-section only or time-series only data – i.e. they are only noted when various 
cross sections are considered over time.  
d) Panel data models assist in constructing and testing more complicated 
behavioural models than can be tested using purely cross-section or time-series 
data. 
 
Studenmund (2011), further explains that panel data is useful because it increases sample 
sizes and provides insight into analytical questions, which cannot be answered by using 
times-series or cross-sectional data alone. Panel data also allows researchers to avoid 
omitted variable problems that would otherwise have caused bias in cross-sectional 
studies. Omitted-variable bias occurs when a statistical model leaves out relevant 
variables. This results in the effect of the excluded variables being shown as part of the 
effect of the included variables  
 
However, panel data is not without its flaws. Baltagi (2005) lists some of the limitations of 
panel data, which include:  




b) There may be distortions of measurement errors, which may arise for a number 
of reasons including faulty responses due to unclear questions, memory errors 
etc.  
c) Collecting panel data is quite costly.  
 
5.6. Estimation Techniques 
The main purpose of any regression analysis is to take a purely theoretical equation such 
as the following:  
 
 𝑌𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖 Equation 5.3.  
 
And use a relevant dataset to create an estimated equation such as the following where 
the “hat” on each coefficient indicates a sample estimate of the true population value.  
 
 ?̂?𝑖 =  ?̂?0 + ?̂?1𝑋𝑖 
 
Equation 5.4.  
Therefore, the purpose of the estimation technique used is to obtain numerical values for 
the coefficients of a theoretical regression equation (Equation 5.2) – thereby giving it 
quantitative value in addition to the already established qualitative value (Studenmund, 
2011).  
 
5.6.1 Ordinary Least Squares  
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is the most common technique used in the estimation 
of the coefficients of econometric models. The OLS technique is a standard technique 
used and the results are often still shown as a point of reference when other techniques 
are used (Studenmund, 2011).  
 
OLS is a technique used to estimate a regression by calculating the coefficients so as 
to minimise the sum of the squared residuals because the residuals are the differences 
between the actual Ys and the estimated Ys produced by the regression estimation 
(Studenmund, 2011).  
 
According to Studenmund (2011) there are no less than three important reasons why 




a) OLS is relatively easy to use: OLS is the most simple of all the econometric 
estimation techniques. The majority of the other techniques uses involve highly 
complex non-linear formulas or iterative procedures, which require complicated 
calculations. On the other hand, OLS estimates could technically be computed 
without using a computer due to their relative simplicity.  
b) The goal of minimising the sum of the squared residuals is quite appropriate from 
a theoretical point of view: since it is reasonable to want the estimated regression 
to be as close as possible to the observed data you would want to minimise the 
residuals (the residuals measures how close the estimated regression equation 
comes to the actual observed data). However, the residuals cannot simply be 
totalled because their values can be positive or negative so this could cancel 
values out. Therefore, the square of the residuals is minimised.  
c) OLS estimates have a number of useful characteristics including the following:  
i. The sum of the residuals is exactly zero  
ii. OLS can be shown to be the “best” (minimum variance) estimator 
possible under a set of specific assumption.  
 
Note that an estimator is a mathematical technique applied to a sample of data to 
produced actual numerical estimates of the true population regression coefficients. 
Therefore, OLS is an estimator and a coefficient produced by OLS is an estimate.  
 
5.6.2 Generalised Least Squares (GLS)  
As explained in the previous section, contemporaneous correlation of the error terms 
was suspected. GLS is a technique for estimating the unknown parameters in a linear 
regression model when there is a certain degree of correlation between the residuals 
in a regression model.  
 
GLS regression extends the OLS estimation of the normal linear model by providing for 
possibly unequal error variances8 and for correlations between different errors (Fox & 
Weisberg, 2010).  
 
                                                          
 
8 Note: EViews does not have an option to implement Newey-West for panel data in order to correct 




GLS is a technique that rids equation of pure first order serial correlation and in the 
process restores the minimum variance property to the estimation (Studenmund, 2011).  
 
The GLS technique was used in two specifications of the model, the first using random 
effects and the second using SUR.  
  
5.6.3 The Fixed and Random Effects Model 
Baltagi (2005) explains the following regarding the fixed and random effects models. 
“A panel data regression differs from a regular time-series or cross-section regression 
in that it has a double subscript on its variables and is stated as follows:  
 
 𝑦𝑖𝑡 =  𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡
′ 𝛽 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡      𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁; 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇 
 
Equation 5.5.  
𝑖 denotes households, individuals, firms, countries, etc. and 𝑡 denotes time. Therefore, 
𝑖 subscript denotes the cross-section dimension whereas the 𝑡 subscript denotes the 
time-series dimension. 𝛼 is a scalar, 𝛽 is K × 1 and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is the 𝑖𝑡th observation on K 
explanatory variables” (Baltagi, 2005). 
 
Most of the panel data applications utilize a one-way error component model for the 
disturbances, with:  
 
 𝜇𝑖𝑡 =  𝜇𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 
 
Equation 5.6.  
Where, 𝜇𝑖 denotes the unobservable individual-specific effect and 𝑣𝑖𝑡 denotes the 
remainder disturbance” (Baltagi, 2005).   
 
In the case of the fixed effects model, the 𝜇𝑖s are assumed to be fixed parameters to 
be estimated and the remainder disturbances stochastic (having a random probability 
distribution) with 𝑣𝑖𝑡 independent and identically distributed 𝐼𝐼𝐷 (0, 𝜎𝑣
2). The 𝑋𝑖𝑡  are 
assumed to be independent of the 𝑣𝑖𝑡 for all 𝑖 and 𝑡. The fixed effects model is an 
appropriate specification if we are focusing on a specific set of 𝑁 firms, and our 
inference is restricted to the behaviour of these sets of firms. Alternatively, it could be 
a set of 𝑁  OECD countries or 𝑁 South African provinces or 𝑁 American states. 
Inference in this case is conditional on the particular 𝑁 firms, countries, provinces or 





In the case of the random effects model, the 𝜇𝑖 can be assumed random. In this case, 
𝜇𝑖  ~ 𝐼𝐼𝐷 (0, 𝜎𝜇
2), 𝑣𝑖𝑡  ~ 𝐼𝐼𝐷 (0, 𝜎𝑣
2), and the 𝜇𝑖 are independent of the 𝑣𝑖𝑡. In addition, the 
𝑋𝑖𝑡  are independent of the 𝜇𝑖 and 𝑣𝑖𝑡, for all 𝑖 and 𝑡 (Baltagi, 2005). 
 
The random effects model is an appropriate specification used when drawing 𝑁 
individuals randomly from a large population. 𝑁 is usually large and a fixed effects 
model would lead to an enormous loss of degrees of freedom. The individual effect is 
characterized as random and inferences can be made for the population from which 
this sample was randomly drawn (Baltagi, 2005). 
 
Therefore, the random effects models are used in the analysis of panel data when one 
assumes no fixed effects - it allows for individual effects. The random effects approach 
is appropriate when drawing “random” draws from a large population (𝑁 approaching 
infinity) to make inferences about the characteristics of the population (De Jager, 2008).  
 
According to EViews (2019), the random effects specifications assumes that the 
corresponding cross section effects are realisations of independent random variables 
with mean zero and finite variance.  
 
The Hausman test yielded a p-value of 0, which means that the random effects result 
is no different than the standard OLS result.  
  
5.6.4 Seemingly Unrelated Regressions  
The SUR technique “models endogenous variables as linear functions of lagged 
endogenous variables and all exogenous variables in the system. The system of 
equations in the model is estimated jointly. This means that the effect of the 
independent variables on each endogenous variable takes into account the 
endogenous nature of the other endogenous variables. SUR techniques are also useful 
because they allow for slope coefficients and the intercept coefficients to vary across 
cross-sections” (De Jager, 2008). De Jager (2008) noted that allowing for both the slope 
and intercept coefficients to vary, captures efficiency due to the correlation of 
disturbances across equations. According to Baltagi (2005), Zellner’s SUR approach is 






According to the EViews Help Guide, (EViews, 2019), the GLS adjustment ‘Period 
SUR’ corrects for heteroscedasticity, which is the violation of Classical Assumption V, 
which states that the observations of the error terms are drawn from a distribution that 
has a constant variance Studenmund (2011) and Asteriou & Hall (2011). Therefore, 
heteroscedasticity refers to the case where the error term that does not have a constant 
variance.  
 
Period SUR specifically corrects for general correlation of observations within a cross-
section. The classical linear regression model (CLRM) “assumes that the variances and 
correlations between different disturbances are all equal to zero”, which implies that the 
error terms are independently distributed (Asteriou & Hall, 2011). In cases where this 
assumption is violated, the error terms are said to be serially correlated. Serial 
correlation can be caused by factors such as omitted variables, misspecification of the 
model and systematic errors in measurement (Asteriou & Hall, 2007).  
 
According to EViews (2019), period SUR allows for arbitrary heteroscedasticity and 
serial correlation between the residuals for a given cross-section. A Period SUR 
specification involves covariances across periods within a given cross-section, as in a 
seemingly unrelated regressions framework with period specific equations. 
 
“The simplest version of a linear, constant parameter SUR system is one that contains 
m ≥ 2 linear regression equations, 𝑦𝑖 =  𝑋𝑖 𝛽𝑖 +  𝜇𝑖 , 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , 𝑚, where  𝑦𝑖 is an 𝑛 × 1 
vector of observations on the 𝑖th dependent variable, 𝑋𝑖 is an 𝑛 ×  𝑘𝑖 matrix with full 
column rank of observations on the 𝑘𝑖 independent variables in the 𝑖th regression 
equation, 𝛽𝑖 is a 𝑘𝑖  × 1 vector of regression parameters and  𝜇𝑖 is an 𝑛 × 1 vector of 
zero mean error terms. The usual method of estimating the regression coefficients was 
to estimate the equations individually by least squares to obtain 𝛽𝑖 = (𝑋𝑖′𝑋𝑖) − 1𝑋𝑖
′𝑦𝑖 , 𝑖 =
1, 2, … , 𝑚. However, in Zellner’s 1962 work it was shown that when the error terms are 
correlated across the equations, the equations are related and joint estimation, rather 
than equation-by-equation estimation, leads to more precise estimates of the 
regression coefficients and predictions of future values of the dependent variables. The 
use of SUR techniques leads to improved tests of hypotheses regarding regression 






5.7. Data Sources  
In order to utilise the model to obtain results relevant for South Africa, research was 
undertaken to obtain panel data on South African MNE’s specifically. The following 
pragmatic approach was taken with regard to data collection in order to obtain a suitable 
set of South African panel data to be employed in the research study:  
a) Research was conducted using the Bureau van Dijk Orbis Global Database.  
b) The Orbis database contains information on companies worldwide. While the 
majority of firms in ORBIS are located in developed economies, the data also 
contains some information on certain countries in the developing world. Orbis 
data is collected from various (partly private and partly official) sources, which 
may differ between countries. As a result of the method of collection of data, it is 
a well-known problem of the Orbis data that the firm coverage differs across 
countries. Some economies, particularly developing countries, are relatively 
poorly represented. In this regard, firm coverage tends to be particularly small in 
Africa, while there is significantly more information available on firms in Latin 
American, South America and Asia (Fuest & Riedel, 2010). The issue of the 
absence of comparable data for developing countries is an important one. This is 
because one cannot compare the profits of companies operating in different 
regions with one another or try to draw inferences on developing countries based 
on the data of companies operating in developed countries because the various 
economic factors in a particular region have an impact on the risk profile, cost 
structure and consequently, the profit margins of companies (Gonnet, et al., 
2014).    
c) The Orbis database provides balance sheet information and data on profit and 
loss account items. In addition, information on ownership structure is included, 
(relation to all direct and indirect shareholders of the firm) as well as to 
subsidiaries within the multinational group. Finally, ORBIS provides information, 
which may allow researchers to determine the location of a parent firms’ 
subsidiaries (Fuest & Riedel, 2010). It should be noted that the database contains 
lagged financial information, i.e. information for the current financial period is not 
generally available. At the time of conducting the study, the most complete 
information was available for the 2017 year.  





e) Only South African companies were selected  
f) Only active companies were selected 
g) Only companies with available accounts for 2010 (oldest available year) through 
2017 (latest complete available year) were selected. Specifically, EBIT was 
available for all 8 years.  
h) The firms included in the analysis belong to multinational groups in the sense that 
either the parent company or one of their wholly owned subsidiaries was located 
in a foreign economy.  
i) The following financial and descriptive data was downloaded for the 28 
companies identified for each of the 8 years (note: only EBIT was available for all 
companies for all years).  
i. EBIT 
ii. Control variables explained in section 5.4.  
iii. Number, name and county code of subsidiaries  
iv. Group ultimate owner name and country code.  
j) The search was refined by selecting only companies where the South African 
company (i.e. the company included in the dataset) was the Group Ultimate 
Owner (or parent of the group) since these companies showed their subsidiaries 
and their relevant countries of operation. Five companies were rejected as they 
were not the parent company. Therefore, the relevant data for 23 South African 





























2010 3 059 162 20 402 226 33 054 16 113 875 11.90 7.47 61.86 7 781 152 -644 309 
2011 4 315 506 26 032 259 33 708 21 055 843 17.20 7.75 61.91 9 915 130 -933 293 
2012 4 352 538 24 087 262 33 415 19 568 318 20.39 8.48 64.75 8 489 906 -927 602 
2013 3 935 515 24 398 983 32 944 17 013 723 24.35 7.59 62.11 9 244 783 -855 280 
2014 4 254 940 26 433 765 33 400 19 522 942 25.61 7.74 62.36 9 950 012 -828 335 
2015 3 737 652 26 528 204 30 919 15 466 827 22.52 8.15 60.72 10 420 796 -613 823 
2016 1 605 263 26 443 996 30 100 11 806 107 11.29 7.33 54.37 12 067 289 -401 190 
2017 2 297 272 30 540 902 30 900 13 327 898 12.91 6.86 54.45 13 910 484 -370 834 
Group 
B 
2010 77 938 585 688 1 620 2 247 487 4.46 30.44 58.30 244 212 -12 019 
2011 78 580 741 806 1 357 2 733 654 4.50 18.52 57.79 313 095 -15 610 
2012 71 953 578 463 1 216 2 204 675 3.59 34.89 59.24 235 798 -18 183 
2013 59 582 563 837 1 112 1 872 740 3.58 10.22 56.96 242 661 -14 999 
2014 62 798 623 127 1 186 1 861 685 4.13 14.87 54.19 285 447 -17 118 
2015 69 509 576 867 1 271 1 823 951 4.25 15.50 55.76 255 220 -17 166 
                                                          
 




2016 66 531 462 751 776 1 667 776 5.40 15.87 61.86 176 486 -15 380 
2017 87 203 662 413 796 2 017 266 10.94 12.15 57.43 281 960 -20 352 
Group 
C 
2010 308 901 707 984 9 408 929 189 n.a. 15.78 80.81 135 864 -58 506 
2011 419 579 913 099 9 475 1 180 544 n.a. 15.18 81.07 172 820 -65 578 
2012 388 892 843 249 9 719 1 101 819 n.a. 13.49 86.47 114 107 -80 923 
2013 333 626 720 675 10 184 990 272 n.a. 12.70 85.60 103 775 -151 643 
2014 316 623 761 707 10 565 1 008 536 n.a. 12.39 82.24 135 251 -153 469 
2015 281 761 750 678 11 361 948 985 516.50 10.78 81.95 135 511 -59 481 
2016 267 070 1 154 709 12 037 1 152 543 17.28 7.09 50.55 570 959 -53 729 
2017 299 714 1 235 526 11 563 1 415 431 12.59 9.65 58.55 512 079 -61 592 
Group 
D 
2010 69 101 667 415 2 969 333 987 4.00 99.30 62.19 252 333 0 
2011 186 383 2 400 754 n.a. 955 031 3.77 37.94 51.80 1 157 167 0 
2012 339 880 2 264 345 n.a. 1 176 938 6.50 51.31 44.43 1 258 259 0 
2013 266 691 1 894 998 n.a. 1 077 420 6.52 116.59 52.34 903 250 -47 728 
2014 259 850 1 952 983 n.a. 1 017 752 7.88 104.53 50.93 958 390 -62 282 
2015 195 946 2 022 863 12 847 931 526 4.04 105.03 31.20 1 391 663 -47 174 
2016 176 282 1 742 250 12 747 832 671 3.84 98.14 34.96 1 133 240 -43 541 
2017 279 805 2 450 965 12 854 996 192 3.49 114.98 41.36 1 437 219 -50 488 
Group 
E 
2010 0 737 853 12 096 n.a. n.a. n.a. 51.55 357 526 0 
2011 154 115 792 271 10 970 1 227 915 18.02 9.25 53.08 371 709 -62 373 
2012 173 892 674 148 9 816 1 028 100 45.78 8.50 65.37 233 432 -50 053 




2014 172 657 669 899 10 834 982 542 33.26 7.93 59.36 272 238 -58 561 
2015 152 439 658 616 11 100 921 743 25.52 7.52 49.05 335 580 -56 844 
2016 140 032 611 236 11 587 824 959 15.85 6.80 49.71 307 381 -51 751 
2017 166 018 709 377 10 944 1 009 351 15.13 6.80 52.36 337 953 -65 259 
Group F 
2010 72 838 651 689 8 262 959 987 19.83 109.67 33.44 433 743 -10 195 
2011 69 121 728 229 8 585 997 850 17.61 88.13 36.55 462 064 -6 749 
2012 49 051 795 456 n.a. 1 082 719 9.19 85.56 35.76 511 013 0 
2013 -12 346 680 098 n.a. 1 003 733 -1.27 114.55 32.80 457 009 0 
2014 16 289 587 912 11 421 884 739 3.60 85.35 34.85 383 009 0 
2015 24 267 561 183 10 295 920 017 6.68 96.56 36.78 354 778 0 
2016 18 332 405 472 10 476 605 070 6.06 95.92 40.06 243 057 0 
2017 -8 156 504 198 10 412 700 283 -1.16 62.87 37.19 316 681 0 
Group 
G 
2010 64 015 314 867 5 552 573 312 28.25 6.27 60.15 125 481 -14 950 
2011 73 929 304 821 5 951 547 764 74.34 6.43 63.76 110 468 -11 267 
2012 75 458 387 462 4 835 548 889 21.86 6.18 62.32 145 997 -18 345 
2013 47 195 712 432 5 870 509 986 16.85 4.23 50.70 351 249 -13 279 
2014 69 351 685 147 5 651 642 843 6.89 4.94 53.42 319 147 -13 746 
2015 47 909 581 567 8 218 508 037 5.70 4.55 55.03 261 558 -8 960 
2016 44 320 586 881 8 673 663 841 4.00 5.65 52.04 281 456 -10 160 
2017 62 895 657 091 9 103 781 432 4.39 5.68 51.76 316 958 -12 905 
Group 
H 
2010 184 527 1 139 370 6 422 1 537 249 185.31 12.43 56.22 498 825 -62 350 




2012 188 606 793 243 6 654 1 407 946 141.16 33.26 67.43 258 346 -66 327 
2013 132 385 733 683 6 304 1 073 119 100.19 9.95 66.97 242 349 -55 121 
2014 223 174 845 425 6 288 964 026 26.63 11.11 66.09 286 714 -45 524 
2015 99 719 677 210 5 853 618 128 51.22 8.67 71.55 192 665 -39 936 
2016 96 417 713 514 6 492 590 239 37.48 6.33 71.57 202 843 -43 192 
2017 114 230 747 383 6 609 701 380 24.60 6.58 71.79 210 829 -48 337 
Group I 
2010 2 050 808 537 5 652 168 434 5.68 n.a.  52.76 72 694 0 
2011 25 310 901 041 5 850 202 929 11.58 n.a.  58.48 75 720 -4 133 
2012 27 174 739 939 n.a. 178 373 12.01 n.a.  64.95 58 070 0 
2013 26 658 661 695 6 025 180 752 24.50 n.a.  68.89 47 138 0 
2014 23 235 596 073 6 053 184 698 21.31 424.79 71.99 41 227 0 
2015 22 901 548 470 6 434 172 017 29.77 308.44 73.61 34 310 -3 835 
2016 20 044 477 123 6 310 213 070 58.18 43.54 51.42 99 974 -4 502 
2017 28 070 553 399 6 311 289 739 8.12 51.58 77.52 52 810 0 
Group J 
2010 2 769 59 295 814 173 981 3.40 907.82 44.20 33 090 0 
2011 3 174 55 047 25 082 165 612 3.06 403.40 44.03 30 808 0 
2012 2 982 59 927 23 556 173 123 2.82 460.21 41.09 35 306 0 
2013 -325 50 792 26 510 158 321 0.58 643.46 39.83 30 562 0 
2014 4 423 48 605 32 353 155 671 3.81 584.38 48.38 25 092 0 
2015 4 936 44 229 33 185 122 085 3.59 461.64 51.52 21 440 0 
2016 6 662 64 829 33 490 179 858 3.34 897.62 50.36 32 181 0 






2010 14 773 197 015 320 166 009 8.89 35.80 57.22 84 282 0 
2011 21 940 230 899 1 245 205 589 19.98 35.97 58.24 96 432 0 
2012 22 356 235 666 1 360 185 287 10.19 23.63 57.83 99 371 0 
2013 21 100 269 253 n.a. 199 646 5.85 22.11 56.87 116 131 0 
2014 29 213 375 643 n.a. 260 375 5.27 36.26 54.58 170 631 0 
2015 30 784 391 730 1 573 274 739 3.90 33.62 51.18 191 233 0 
2016 29 643 464 819 2 135 315 894 2.81 33.95 50.23 231 362 0 
2017 -11 123 536 199 n.a. 339 769 -0.40 19.13 54.76 242 593 0 
Group L 
2010 42 901 766 949 n.a. 104 170 1.02 n.a.  24.56 578 605 0 
2011 5 301 909 548 n.a. 135 462 0.93 n.a.  22.73 702 767 0 
2012 72 761 881 590 n.a. 135 244 0.99 n.a.  30.67 611 241 0 
2013 17 483 1 026 884 n.a. 136 819 0.84 n.a.  27.81 741 363 0 
2014 36 591 1 103 883 n.a. 147 576 1.12 n.a.  26.62 810 034 -133 
2015 123 981 1 193 362 n.a. 152 374 4.34 n.a.  71.21 343 634 -27 040 
2016 112 131 1 245 934 n.a. 159 845 3.78 n.a.  68.04 398 176 -64 275 
2017 116 460 1 319 670 n.a. 136 454 2.75 n.a.  75.27 326 357 -82 314 
Group 
M 
2010 63 997 1 551 406 579 190 035 n.a.  n.a.  13.15 1 347 336 -9 641 
2011 78 919 1 932 838 565 200 050 0.88 n.a.  13.19 1 677 846 n.a. 
2012 74 632 1 870 804 558 181 253 0.81 n.a.  15.22 1 586 141 n.a. 
2013 -40 109 2 028 408 524 165 665 n.a.  n.a.  9.15 1 842 829 -16 187 
2014 71 940 2 034 184 573 166 008 0.85 n.a.  12.52 1 779 590 -20 134 




2016 68 722 1 951 823 743 124 805 -0.06 n.a.  13.13 1 695 543 -23 785 
2017 62 865 2 063 242 714 127 631 -0.14 n.a.  12.92 1 796 694 -26 399 
Group 
N 
2010 36 510 160 944 1 555 98 050 5.92 248.71 20.54 127 881 -9 919 
2011 27 975 183 332 1 530 115 927 3.71 331.04 20.17 146 358 -6 550 
2012 28 568 157 571 1 495 107 794 4.15 318.98 23.34 120 789 -6 970 
2013 30 167 136 176 1 530 97 270 6.83 327.67 31.00 93 957 -7 480 
2014 35 708 160 708 1 825 100 236 7.57 162.23 33.21 107 333 n.a. 
2015 37 404 163 850 1 866 106 827 7.19 182.97 36.40 104 215 -8 173 
2016 30 602 149 040 1 907 101 059 7.03 193.07 39.59 90 034 -7 286 
2017 32 566 179 971 n.a. 116 395 6.71 222.12 39.74 108 444 -7 605 
Group 
O 
2010 3 082 16 327 n.a. 26 544 19.59 n.a.  34.21 10 741 -233 
2011 2 669 15 494 250 25 917 17.14 n.a.  45.59 8 430 -492 
2012 3 139 17 906 277 26 882 35.41 n.a.  47.77 9 353 -375 
2013 3 046 17 714 313 30 123 40.27 n.a.  51.61 8 572 -532 
2014 4 798 27 986 357 38 336 54.78 n.a.  62.38 10 528 0 
2015 6 406 46 060 450 47 164 7.79 n.a.  57.15 19 737 -1 155 
2016 8 317 65 304 664 53 886 6.30 n.a.  48.99 33 312 -1 270 
2017 9 802 83 173 670 76 071 5.94 n.a.  61.53 31 993 -1 576 
Group 
P 
2010 792 12 131 n.a. 5 931 n.a. n.a.  86.38 1 652 0 
2011 681 12 952 n.a. 6 932 21.77 n.a.  87.78 1 583 -147 
2012 -985 10 352 n.a. 6 590 n.a.  n.a.  78.64 2 211 0 




2014 781 27 756 244 22 022 5.18 n.a.  56.85 11 976 0 
2015 3 111 37 870 271 53 737 13.13 n.a.  37.50 23 668 0 
2016 3 740 36 056 304 60 542 13.61 n.a.  41.99 20 918 -439 
2017 4 727 44 427 449 78 268 9.44 n.a.  46.13 23 933 0 
Group 
Q 
2010 16 090 69 467 n.a. 46 905 78.35 56.09 75.18 17 244 -3 578 
2011 17 140 81 563 n.a. 60 858 121.44 73.80 73.26 21 809 -4 222 
2012 21 346 73 635 n.a. 63 275 261.32 50.37 71.25 21 169 -4 942 
2013 19 480 69 006 n.a. 66 717 279.86 39.24 67.87 22 171 -9 871 
2014 19 040 69 603 n.a. 70 920 779.12 61.98 70.41 20 594 -10 406 
2015 16 840 90 692 40 65 024 n.a.  67.63 77.20 20 674 -11 739 
2016 14 803 72 197 n.a. 53 370 n.a.  64.91 81.06 13 676 -3 511 
2017 16 442 75 879 n.a. 51 969 n.a.  53.32 84.46 11 789 -5 066 
Group 
R 
2010 4 506 137 473 n.a. 97 715 1.69 4.40 32.43 92 891 0 
2011 -5 527 135 822 630 96 872 -1.26 5.75 33.78 89 946 0 
2012 14 242 123 883 n.a. 98 326 8.53 7.72 49.45 62 617 0 
2013 11 675 107 680 n.a. 81 682 6.63 5.63 53.91 49 633 0 
2014 2 044 89 966 n.a. 65 764 -7.61 5.07 57.71 38 050 0 
2015 16 190 83 740 n.a. 77 433 22.34 8.91 65.30 29 057 -5 226 
2016 -8 925 60 471 477 45 894 -33.14 6.09 60.07 24 149 0 
2017 -12 110 51 288 490 41 437 -34.86 9.28 52.35 24 439 0 
Group 
S 
2010 5 289 19 188 132 21 591 167.19 n.a.  61.32 7 422 -2 353 




2012 7 024 26 761 n.a. 27 018 699.00 n.a.  61.82 10 218 0 
2013 6 336 26 296 n.a. 23 558 740.23 n.a.  64.74 9 273 -1 777 
2014 6 344 24 899 n.a. 22 925 n.a.  n.a.  66.76 8 277 -1 565 
2015 6 429 25 553 n.a. 20 911 n.a.  n.a.  64.76 9 005 -1 691 
2016 5 050 20 349 n.a. 16 176 n.a.  n.a.  72.92 5 510 -1 398 
2017 5 790 23 074 n.a. 17 975 n.a.  n.a.  75.38 5 681 -1 517 
Group T 
2010 114 544 85 807 n.a. 123 099 n.a. n.a.  30.66 59 502 0 
2011 5 735 26 280 n.a. 1 554 n.a. n.a.  78.99 5 522 0 
2012 806 25 640 n.a. 3 483 n.a. n.a.  80.69 4 952 0 
2013 664 19 494 n.a. 2 535 n.a. n.a.  91.41 1 675 0 
2014 11 782 15 321 n.a. 13 726 n.a. n.a.  91.53 1 298 0 
2015 320 11 700 n.a. 495 n.a. n.a.  92.24 908 0 
2016 -634 12 925 n.a. 471 -35.47 n.a.  90.34 1 249 0 





As explained above, the corporate tax term was adjusted since all companies were South 
African. The term 𝜏𝑖𝑡 was adjusted to be the average foreign corporate tax rate of the 
group. In order to calculate the foreign corporate tax rate of the group, the following steps 
were taken:  
a) Subsidiaries of each South African parent company were listed along with their 
country codes as per Orbis. The country codes shown are ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 
codes, which are two-letter country codes defined in ISO 3166-1, part of the ISO 
3166 standard published by the International Organization for Standardization 
(ISO). The standard represents countries, dependent territories, and special 
areas of geographical interest and are the most widely used of the country codes 
published by ISO (the others being alpha-3 and numeric) (International 
Organization for Standardization, 2019).  
b) The relevant country of each subsidiary was determined based on the country 
code as per Orbis.  
c) South African subsidiaries and subsidiaries with unknown country codes were 
removed.  
d) The relevant country corporate tax rate was identified for each of the remaining 
subsidiaries using the Deloitte Corporate Tax Rate guide (Deloitte, 2019).  
e) The simple average tax rate was calculated across all the known foreign 
subsidiaries of the group. It should be noted that it would be more accurate to use 
the weighted average tax rate, however, complete financial information for each 
of the foreign subsidiaries was not available; therefore, the weighted average 
could not be calculated. The simple mean is calculated as the sum of all the 
observations divided by the number of observations, whereas the weighted 
average assigns a weight to each observation and then sums the multiple of the 
weight and the observation and then divides this by the number of observations 
(Hu, 2010).  
f) The anonymised results are shown below.  
 
Table 3: Anonymised foreign group tax rates for 23 South African parented 
groups 
 
GROUP Average Group Foreign Tax Rate 
Group A 19.72% 




Group C 24.19% 
Group D 10.67% 
Group E 30.56% 
Group F 5.00% 
Group G 20.07% 
Group H 23.34% 
Group I 24.07% 
Group J 26.75% 
Group K 23.50% 
Group L 29.33% 
Group M 11.20% 
Group N 28.29% 
Group O 26.20% 
Group P 27.60% 
Group Q 24.29% 
Group R 26.78% 
Group S 30.00% 
Group T 0.00% 
 
5.8. Conclusion  
This chapter discussed the theoretical and empirical model specifications as well as the 
estimation techniques used in the study. The techniques considered included OLS, GLS, 
the fixed and random effects models as well as seemingly unrelated regressions. In 
addition, the data sources and definition of variables used in the study were discussed in 
detail.  
 
In summary, the study aimed to employ two different estimation techniques (GLS with 
random effects and GLS with SUR) in order to estimate the effect of transfer pricing 
legislation on profit shifting in a sample of South African parented MNE groups. The 
estimation techniques were compared in order to determine which technique was better 
suited to the regression and the dataset. This is discussed further in the next chapter along 






CHAPTER 6: ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS AND EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
 
6.1. Introduction  
This chapter presents the econometric analysis and the empirical findings for this study 
using the model and the methodology discussed in the previous chapter. This study 
employs GLS techniques in combination with random effects and SUR as the approach 
to establish the effect of transfer pricing legislation on profit shifting in a sample of South 
African parented MNE groups.  
 
6.2. Sample  
As explained in the preceding section, South African parented MNE’s were selected due 
to the availability of information on subsidiary locations. In addition, the consideration of 
South African parented MNE’s is meaningful because of the importance to the South 
African economy of having MNE firms headquartered in South Africa. It is thought that the 
activities of a multinational firm headquarters are desirable for an economy due to the 
positive effects it creates. Having MNE firms headquartered in South Africa creates jobs 
for South Africans, which stimulates economic activity; the capital investment in a 
headquarters would build the capital stock, which enables future productivity and growth 
(Clausing, 2010).   
 
In addition, Clausing (2010) also purports that MNE headquarters usually undertake highly 
specialised activities, which are more likely to generate learning and innovation, since 
research, development, and entrepreneurial activities are activities usually conducted by 
MNE headquarters. Furthermore, multinational firms may be able to generate high profits 
due to their size, market power, and firm-specific knowledge in addition to being the 
location of high skilled jobs that attract high wages. The high profits would be available to 
be taxed in that respective country i.e. South Africa (Dischinger & Riedel, 2009).  
 
The activities of multinational headquarters are additionally beneficial if its activities spill 
over to the economy at large. For example, research and development could generate 
learning that benefits other firms and that increases productivity for the entire economy. 
Similarly, excess profits could influence the economy more widely through enhanced 






A study by Dischinger and Riedel (2009) uses a large firm-level dataset (Amadeus 
database) of European firms to study the profitability of headquarters firms relative to their 
subsidiaries. Their results find headquarter firms to be more profitable than their 
subsidiaries. The profitability gap is found to be about 30 percent. This suggests that 
multinational headquarters will generate larger profits and subsequently, greater tax 
payments (Dischinger & Riedel, 2010). Therefore, headquarter firms are important to an 
economy as they tend to produce useful economic spill-overs. 
 
6.3. Use of dummies and interaction terms  
A dummy (or binary or dichotomous) variable is an indicator variable, which is used to 
account for qualitative factors in an econometric model. A dummy variable takes on one 
of two values – generally, one or zero to indicate the presence or absence of a 
characteristic or to indicate whether a certain condition is true or false. A dummy variable 
indicates the creation of a numeric variable for a qualitative, non-numeric characteristic 
(Carter Hill, et al., 2011). In this analysis the presence of transfer pricing rules, and 
changes to those rules, is depicted through the use of a dummy variable.  
 
In some case it may be expected that the effect of one variable is modified by another. An 
interaction variable that is the product of the two variables involved can be used to account 
for such interactions between two variables (Carter Hill, et al., 2011). In other words, the 
effect of one independent variable on the dependent variable is different at different values 
of the other independent variable. Therefore, adding a term to the model that multiplies 
the two variables captures this effect (Cornell Statistical Consulting Unit, 2000). In this 
analysis an interaction term has been included to indicate the additional effect of the 
transfer pricing rules on profit shifting (through EBIT) depending on the groups’ foreign tax 
rate. This is based on the assumption that the group’s foreign tax rate is reflective of its 
level of profit shifting.    
 
6.4. Expectations  
In the baseline results of the Riedel et al. (2015) study, they found that 𝛽2 = 1.709 and 𝛽3 
= -0.468. The results suggested a significant effect of transfer price documentation 
requirements on their tested firms’ EBIT. For affiliates subject to a corporate tax rate of 
30%, reported EBIT was found to increase by 4.5% on average. For affiliates in higher-
tax (lower-tax) countries with corporate tax rates at the 75th and 90th (10th) percentile of 




37.25% (19%) respectively), reported EBIT was found to increase by 12.2% and 16.9% 
(decrease by 14.3%). These percentages were obtained by considering the impact of 
𝛽2 and 𝛽3 together as these, together, show the impact of transfer pricing rules on EBIT. 
The relevant portion of the model is depicted below:  
 
 𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽2(𝜏𝑖𝑡  . 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽3𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 
 
Equation 6.1  
Therefore, the effect of transfer pricing rules on EBIT based on the test by Riedel et al. 
(2015) is as follows:  
     
 𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = (1.709. 𝜏) + (−0.468) 
 
Equation 6.2  
In the simplified model applied to South African firm data, it was assumed that that profits 
(EBIT) were shifted away from South Africa when the foreign average corporate tax rate 
is lower than South African corporate tax rate (i.e. lower than 28%) i.e. profits are shifted 
to countries where they would be taxed at a lower rate.  
 
Therefore, it was expected that the introduction of transfer pricing rules would lead to a 
resultant increase in EBIT reported by the South African entities, which formed part of a 
group that had an average foreign corporate tax rate lower than the South African rate of 
28%. In other words, it was expected that South African companies would reduce profit 
shifting to lower tax countries and start to report higher profits in South Africa, which would 
be available to be taxed at the South African tax rate of 28%.  
 
Therefore, the expectation was:  
 
 𝛽2(𝜏𝑖𝑡  . 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽3𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 > 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜏 < 28% 
 
Equation 6.3  
In addition, it was expected that  𝛽3𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 > 0 on a standalone basis, when 𝜏 < 28%. 
Therefore, the sign of the transfer pricing rules was undetermined since it is dependent 
on the particular foreign tax rate.  
 
It should be noted that, unlike the Riedel et al. (2015) test, the opposite was not expected 
since it would not generally be expected that EBIT would decrease when rules are 




is not considered to be a low tax region so it is very unlikely profits are shifted to South 
Africa in the first instance.  
 
6.5. Random Effects and the Hausman Test 
In order to determine the appropriateness of the random effects model, the Hausman test 
was run and the following warning was displayed:  
 
WARNING: estimated cross section effects variance is zero  
 
The Hausman test results showed that p = 0. As explained previously, this would imply 
that the random effects results is no different than the standard OLS result. Therefore, in 
the remainder of this text, the standard OLS technique is referred to rather than the 
random effects technique. 
  
6.6. P-values  
In statistical hypothesis testing, the p-value or the probability value is the probability of 
obtaining test results, which have been observed during the test, assuming that the null 
hypothesis is correct (Wasserstein & Lazar, 2016). Note that the null hypothesis is a 
general statement or default position that there is nothing new happening i.e. there is no 
relationship between two measured phenomena (Everitt, 1998). 
 
In other words, the p-value tells us the probability of obtaining the test results we have 
obtained if there were no relationship between the estimated variable and the dependent 
variable. When the p-value is very low it tells us that the null hypothesis must be rejected 
(i.e. that we could not have obtained the results if the null hypothesis held true; therefore, 
there must be a relationship between the estimated variable(s) and the dependent 
variable) (Studenmund, 2011).  
 
In the following sections, the p-values of specific estimated variables in relation to the 
dependent variable are shown in the results tables under the column heading ‘probability’. 
Similarly, the p-value of the entire regression is shown in the table in line with the row 







6.7. Descriptive Statistics 
The following table shows the descriptive statistics of the dataset used in this analysis.  
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics (Author’s compilation) 
 




EBIT 235207.7 29428 4352538 -40109 774657.1 160 
Rules12 0.75 1 1 0 0.434372 160 
Rules16 0.25 0 1 0 1.434372 160 
Rules17 0.125 0 1 0 0.331757 160 
Interaction12 0.164424 0.2334 0.305556 0 0.119709 160 
Interaction16 0.054808 0 0.305556 0 0.104031 160 
Interaction17 0.027404 0 0.305556 0 0.07853 160 
Foreign Tax Rate 0.219232 0.242407 0.305556 0 0.08376 160 
Interest cover ratio 44.59235 7.38 779.12 -35.47 124.9498 136 
Number of 
employees 
8363.928 5951 35584 40 9998.738 111 
Ordinary 
dividends 
-51128.2 -4133 0 -9333293 159697.6 157 
Solvency ratio 54.78194 56.105 92.24 9.15 18.9355 160 
Stock turnover 
ratio 
99.96626 22.11 907.82 4.23 182.0605 107 
Total assets 1809954 550934 30540902 8688 5541298 160 
Total liabilities 788557.1 135381 13910484 908 2251630 160 
Turnover 1280665 179858 21055843 471 3672584 159 
 
                                                          
 
10 Note: the firm explanatory variables were not logged. These include, Foreign Tax Rate, Interest 
cover ratio, Number of employees, Ordinary dividends, Solvency ratio, Stock turnover ratio, Total 
assets, Total liabilities, Turnover. These variables were included as additional control variables and 




6.8. Standard OLS: Results 
In this section, the results of the model estimation using standard OLS on EViews 10 in 
each of three transfer pricing rules dummy scenarios (2012 – 2017, 2016 – 2017 and 2017 
only) are summarised. Due to the suspected contemporaneous correlation, the OLS 
results are summarised whilst the SUR results are shown in detail. It is noted that the 
overall effect of the transfer pricing rules on EBIT is measured by the effect of the transfer 
pricing rules coefficient and the interaction term coefficient combined as explained further 
below. 
 
6.8.1. Transfer Pricing Rules 2012 – 2017  
The Standard OLS estimates for rules from 2012 -2017 indicated that six out of twelve 
explanatory variables were significantly associated with the natural log of EBIT or 
percentage changes in EBIT, while six explanatory variables were statistically 
insignificant determinants of the natural log of EBIT. Total assets, ordinary dividends, 
stock turnover ratio, total liabilities and the constant term were significant at the one 
percent level of significance. The interest cover ratio was significant at the five percent 
significance level.  
 
The standard OLS estimate did not find a significant relationship between the foreign 
tax rate, the rules dummy, the interaction term, number of employees, solvency ratio 
and turnover and the natural log of EBIT. 
 
Based on the OLS results with rules from 2012 - 2017, the effect of transfer pricing 
rules on EBIT is as follows: 
     
 𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = (3.942721. 𝜏) + (−0.694633) 
 
Equation 6.4  
The table below shows the effect on EBIT for each of the different foreign rates of 
taxation.   
 
Table 5: OLS Estimation Results with rules from 2012-2017 
 
Rules Coefficient  Interaction Coefficient  Foreign tax rate  Effect on EBIT  




-0.694633 3.942721 1.00% -65.52% 
-0.694633 3.942721 2.00% -61.58% 
-0.694633 3.942721 3.00% -57.64% 
-0.694633 3.942721 4.00% -53.69% 
-0.694633 3.942721 5.00% -49.75% 
-0.694633 3.942721 6.00% -45.81% 
-0.694633 3.942721 7.00% -41.86% 
-0.694633 3.942721 8.00% -37.92% 
-0.694633 3.942721 9.00% -33.98% 
-0.694633 3.942721 10.00% -30.04% 
-0.694633 3.942721 11.00% -26.09% 
-0.694633 3.942721 12.00% -22.15% 
-0.694633 3.942721 13.00% -18.21% 
-0.694633 3.942721 14.00% -14.27% 
-0.694633 3.942721 15.00% -10.32% 
-0.694633 3.942721 16.00% -6.38% 
-0.694633 3.942721 17.00% -2.44% 
-0.694633 3.942721 18.00% 1.51% 
-0.694633 3.942721 19.00% 5.45% 
-0.694633 3.942721 20.00% 9.39% 
-0.694633 3.942721 21.00% 13.33% 
-0.694633 3.942721 22.00% 17.28% 
-0.694633 3.942721 23.00% 21.22% 
-0.694633 3.942721 24.00% 25.16% 
-0.694633 3.942721 25.00% 29.10% 
-0.694633 3.942721 26.00% 33.05% 
-0.694633 3.942721 27.00% 36.99% 
-0.694633 3.942721 28.00% 40.93% 
-0.694633 3.942721 29.00% 44.88% 
-0.694633 3.942721 30.00% 48.82% 
-0.694633 3.942721 31.00% 52.76% 





The portion highlighted in blue in the table above, shows which results are in line with 
the expectations. Namely, foreign tax rates between 18% and 27% increased EBIT with 
the addition of transfer pricing rules. Therefore, a portion (not all) of the results were in 
line with the expectation after the implementation of the 2012 transfer pricing rules.  
 
6.8.2. Transfer Pricing Rules 2016 – 2017  
The Standard OLS estimates for rules from 2016 - 2017 indicated that six out of twelve 
explanatory variables were significantly associated with the natural log of EBIT or 
percentage changes in EBIT, while six explanatory variables were statistically 
insignificant determinants of the natural log of EBIT. Total assets, ordinary dividends, 
stock turnover ratio, total liabilities and the constant term were significant at the one 
percent level of significance. The interest cover ratio was significant at the five percent 
significance level.  
 
The standard OLS estimate did not find a significant relationship between the foreign 
tax rate, the rules dummy, the interaction term, number of employees, solvency ratio 
and turnover and the natural log of EBIT. 
 
Based on the OLS results with rules from 2016 - 2017, the effect of transfer pricing 
rules on EBIT is as follows: 
     
 𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = (0.956998. 𝜏) + (−0.025395) 
 
Equation 6.5  
The table below shows the effect on EBIT for each of the different foreign rates of 
taxation.   
 
Table 6: OLS Estimation Results with rules from 2016-2017 
 
Rules Coefficient  Interaction Coefficient  Foreign tax rate  Effect on EBIT  
-0.025395 0.956998 0.00% -2.54% 
-0.025395 0.956998 1.00% -1.58% 
-0.025395 0.956998 2.00% -0.63% 
-0.025395 0.956998 3.00% 0.33% 




-0.025395 0.956998 5.00% 2.25% 
-0.025395 0.956998 6.00% 3.20% 
-0.025395 0.956998 7.00% 4.16% 
-0.025395 0.956998 8.00% 5.12% 
-0.025395 0.956998 9.00% 6.07% 
-0.025395 0.956998 10.00% 7.03% 
-0.025395 0.956998 11.00% 7.99% 
-0.025395 0.956998 12.00% 8.94% 
-0.025395 0.956998 13.00% 9.90% 
-0.025395 0.956998 14.00% 10.86% 
-0.025395 0.956998 15.00% 11.82% 
-0.025395 0.956998 16.00% 12.77% 
-0.025395 0.956998 17.00% 13.73% 
-0.025395 0.956998 18.00% 14.69% 
-0.025395 0.956998 19.00% 15.64% 
-0.025395 0.956998 20.00% 16.60% 
-0.025395 0.956998 21.00% 17.56% 
-0.025395 0.956998 22.00% 18.51% 
-0.025395 0.956998 23.00% 19.47% 
-0.025395 0.956998 24.00% 20.43% 
-0.025395 0.956998 25.00% 21.39% 
-0.025395 0.956998 26.00% 22.34% 
-0.025395 0.956998 27.00% 23.30% 
-0.025395 0.956998 28.00% 24.26% 
-0.025395 0.956998 29.00% 25.21% 
-0.025395 0.956998 30.00% 26.17% 
-0.025395 0.956998 31.00% 27.13% 
-0.025395 0.956998 32.00% 28.08% 
 
The portion highlighted in blue in the table above, shows which results are in line with 
the expectations. Namely, foreign tax rates between 3% and 27% increased EBIT with 
the addition of transfer pricing rules. Therefore, a greater portion of the results were in 
line with the expectation after the implementation of the 2016 transfer pricing rules, 





6.8.3. Transfer Pricing Rules 2017 only  
The Standard OLS estimates for rules in 2017 only indicated that six out of twelve 
explanatory variables were significantly associated with the natural log of EBIT or 
percentage changes in EBIT, while six explanatory variables were statistically 
insignificant determinants of the natural log of EBIT. Total assets, ordinary dividends, 
stock turnover ratio, total liabilities and the constant term are significant at the one 
percent level of significance. The interest cover ratio was significant at the five percent 
significance level.  
 
The standard OLS estimate did not find a significant relationship between the foreign 
tax rate, the rules dummy, the interaction term, number of employees, solvency ratio 
and turnover and the natural log of EBIT. 
 
Based on the OLS results with rules in 2017 only, the effect of transfer pricing rules on 
EBIT is as follows: 
   
 𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = (−2.869434. 𝜏) + (1.092401) 
 
Equation 6.6  
The table below shows the effect on EBIT for each of the different foreign rates of 
taxation.   
 
Table 7: OLS Estimation Results with rules from 2017 only  
 
Rules Coefficient  Interaction Coefficient  Foreign tax rate  Effect on EBIT  
1.092401 -2.869434 0.00% 109.24% 
1.092401 -2.869434 1.00% 106.37% 
1.092401 -2.869434 2.00% 103.50% 
1.092401 -2.869434 3.00% 100.63% 
1.092401 -2.869434 4.00% 97.76% 
1.092401 -2.869434 5.00% 94.89% 
1.092401 -2.869434 6.00% 92.02% 
1.092401 -2.869434 7.00% 89.15% 




1.092401 -2.869434 9.00% 83.42% 
1.092401 -2.869434 10.00% 80.55% 
1.092401 -2.869434 11.00% 77.68% 
1.092401 -2.869434 12.00% 74.81% 
1.092401 -2.869434 13.00% 71.94% 
1.092401 -2.869434 14.00% 69.07% 
1.092401 -2.869434 15.00% 66.20% 
1.092401 -2.869434 16.00% 63.33% 
1.092401 -2.869434 17.00% 60.46% 
1.092401 -2.869434 18.00% 57.59% 
1.092401 -2.869434 19.00% 54.72% 
1.092401 -2.869434 20.00% 51.85% 
1.092401 -2.869434 21.00% 48.98% 
1.092401 -2.869434 22.00% 46.11% 
1.092401 -2.869434 23.00% 43.24% 
1.092401 -2.869434 24.00% 40.37% 
1.092401 -2.869434 25.00% 37.50% 
1.092401 -2.869434 26.00% 34.63% 
1.092401 -2.869434 27.00% 31.77% 
1.092401 -2.869434 28.00% 28.90% 
1.092401 -2.869434 29.00% 26.03% 
1.092401 -2.869434 30.00% 23.16% 
1.092401 -2.869434 31.00% 20.29% 
1.092401 -2.869434 32.00% 17.42% 
 
The portion highlighted in blue in the table above, shows which results are in line with 
the expectations. Namely, foreign tax rates between 0% and 27% increased EBIT with 
the addition of transfer pricing rules. This is in line with the expectation stated in section 
6.4.  Therefore, a greater portion of the results were in line with the expectation after 
the implementation of the 2017 transfer pricing rules, compared with the 
implementation of the 2016 rules. Furthermore, the coefficient of the rules dummy is 
positive, as expected.  
 




The following figure summarises the percentage changes in EBIT for each different 
average foreign tax rate in each of the three transfer pricing rules scenarios.  
 
Figure 6: Change in EBIT with the introduction of transfer pricing rules in all 




The figure above shows that with each improvement or tightening of the transfer pricing 
rules 2012 versus 2016 versus 2017, more of the average group foreign tax rates begin 
to show an increase in South African EBIT. This can be interpreted as an indication 
that the tightening of transfer pricing rules leads to a reduction in profit shifting, based 
on the understanding that reduced profit shifting by South African MNEs would increase 
their South African profitability (i.e. increasing the amount of profits available to be taxed 
in South Africa).  
 
Therefore, the results of the model using the standard OLS estimation technique were 
partially in line with the expectations set forth in section 6.4. above when the rules were 
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rules become more stringent (2016) and are completely in line with the expectations 
when the rules are the most stringent (2017).  
 
In the next section, the results of the model using the SUR technique are discussed.  
 
6.9. SUR: Results  
 
In this section, the results of the model estimation using GLS and SUR on EViews 10 in 
each of three transfer pricing rules dummy scenarios (2012 – 2017, 2016 – 2017 and 2017 
only) are depicted. 
 
6.9.1. Transfer Pricing Rules 2012 – 2017  
The following table shows the estimation results of the transfer pricing rules 2012 – 
2017 scenario.  
 
Table 8: Generalised Least Squares with Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Results 2012 – 2017 (Author’s compilation) 
 
Rules 2012-2017 / Dependent Variable: LnEBIT 
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Probability 




0.3615 -2.075039 0.0422 
Interaction Term: Rules 
2012*Foreign Tax Rate 




2.38E-07 -5.608501 0.0000 
Number of employees 
-0.0000219 
(***) 
7.62E-06 -2.869479 0.0056 
Interest cover ratio 
0.002657 
(***) 




2.16E-06 -6.599898 0.0000 




Stock turnover ratio 
-0.002326 
(***) 




4.85E-07 6.093696 0.0000 




4.30E-01 24.11086 0.0000 
Weighted Stats 
R-squared 0.922289 Mean dependent var 18.1916  
Adjusted R-squared 0.908275 S.D. dependent var 11.03867  
S.E. of regression 0.915101 Sum squared resid 51.08203  
F-statistic 65.81417 Durbin-Watson stat 2.084087  
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Stats 
R-squared 0.883702 Mean dependent var 11.3046  
Sum squared resid 24.86863 Durbin-Watson stat 1.498399  
Notes: (***), (**), (*) indicate one percent, five percent and ten percent level of 
significance, respectively. 
 
The GLS with SUR estimates above indicate that ten out of twelve explanatory 
variables are significantly associated with the natural log of EBIT or percentage 
changes in EBIT, while two explanatory variables are statistically insignificant 
determinants of the natural log of EBIT.  The control variables, namely total assets, 
number of employees, interest cover ratio, ordinary dividends, stock turnover ratio, total 
liabilities and the constant term are significant at the one percent level of significance.  
The rules dummy, the interaction term, and the solvency ratio are significant at the five 
percent significance level. Although most of the control variables are significant, the 
percentage change in EBIT is small. 
 
a) When transfer pricing rules are implemented in South Africa, the EBIT of the 
South African parent entity decreases by 0.750127% 
b) When transfer pricing rules are implemented in South Africa, the EBIT of the 
South African parent entity increases by 3.479707% times the foreign group 
tax rate. This means there is an additional 3.479707% increase for every 




c) For a USD1000 increase in total assets, the EBIT of the South African parent 
entity decreases by 0.00000133% 
d) For a one times increase in the interest cover ratio, the EBIT of the South 
African parent entity increases by 0.002657% 
e) For a USD1000 increase in ordinary dividends, the EBIT of the South African 
parent entity decreases by 0.0000142% 
f) For a one times increase in the stock turnover ratio, the EBIT of the South 
African parent entity decreases by 0.002326% 
g) For a USD1000 increase in total liabilities, the EBIT of the South African parent 
entity increases by 0.00000296% 
h) For a one times increase in the solvency ratio, the EBIT of the South African 
parent entity increases by 0.01475% 
 
Based on the GLS with SUR results with rules from 2012 - 2017, the effect of transfer 
pricing rules on EBIT is as follows: 
     
 𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = (3.479707. 𝜏) + (−0.750127) 
 
Equation 6.7  
The table below shows the effect on EBIT for each of the different foreign rates of 
taxation.   
 
Table 9: GLS with SUR Estimation Results with rules from 2012-2017 
 
Rules Coefficient  Interaction Coefficient  Foreign tax rate  Effect on EBIT  
-0.750127 3.479707 0.00% -75.01% 
-0.750127 3.479707 1.00% -71.53% 
-0.750127 3.479707 2.00% -68.05% 
-0.750127 3.479707 3.00% -64.57% 
-0.750127 3.479707 4.00% -61.09% 
-0.750127 3.479707 5.00% -57.61% 
-0.750127 3.479707 6.00% -54.13% 
-0.750127 3.479707 7.00% -50.65% 
-0.750127 3.479707 8.00% -47.18% 




-0.750127 3.479707 10.00% -40.22% 
-0.750127 3.479707 11.00% -36.74% 
-0.750127 3.479707 12.00% -33.26% 
-0.750127 3.479707 13.00% -29.78% 
-0.750127 3.479707 14.00% -26.30% 
-0.750127 3.479707 15.00% -22.82% 
-0.750127 3.479707 16.00% -19.34% 
-0.750127 3.479707 17.00% -15.86% 
-0.750127 3.479707 18.00% -12.38% 
-0.750127 3.479707 19.00% -8.90% 
-0.750127 3.479707 20.00% -5.42% 
-0.750127 3.479707 21.00% -1.94% 
-0.750127 3.479707 22.00% 1.54% 
-0.750127 3.479707 23.00% 5.02% 
-0.750127 3.479707 24.00% 8.50% 
-0.750127 3.479707 25.00% 11.98% 
-0.750127 3.479707 26.00% 15.46% 
-0.750127 3.479707 27.00% 18.94% 
-0.750127 3.479707 28.00% 22.42% 
-0.750127 3.479707 29.00% 25.90% 
-0.750127 3.479707 30.00% 29.38% 
-0.750127 3.479707 31.00% 32.86% 
-0.750127 3.479707 32.00% 36.34% 
 
The portion highlighted in blue in the table above, shows which results are in line with 
the expectations. Namely, foreign tax rates between 22% and 27% increased EBIT with 
the addition of transfer pricing rules. Therefore, a portion (not all) of the results were in 
line with the expectation after the implementation of the 2012 transfer pricing rules.  
 
6.9.2. Transfer Pricing Rules 2016 – 2017  
The following table shows the estimation results of the transfer pricing rules 2016 – 





Table 10: Generalised Least Squares with Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Results 2016 – 2017 (Author’s compilation) 
 
Rules 2016-2017 / Dependent Variable: LnEBIT 
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Probability 
Foreign Tax Rate 0.719912 0.929526 0.774493 0.4416 
Rules 2016 -0.308813 0.487819 -0.633049 0.5291 
Interaction Term: Rules 
2016*Foreign Tax Rate 




0.000000233 -5.288879 0.0000 
Number of employees 
-0.0000245 
(***) 
0.00000753 -3.2564 0.0018 
Interest cover ratio 
0.002686 
(***) 




0.00000207 -6.647182 0.0000 
Solvency ratio 0.015357 (**) 0.006734 2.280545 0.0261 
Stock turnover ratio 
-0.002405 
(***) 




0.000000477 5.735898 0.0000 




0.34251 29.34695 0.0000 
Weighted Stats 
R-squared 0.914856 Mean dependent var 18.55502  
Adjusted R-squared 0.899502 S.D. dependent var 9.434512  
S.E. of regression 0.918729 Sum squared resid 51.48783  
F-statistic 59.58475 Durbin-Watson stat 1.959957  
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Stats 
R-squared 0.882031 Mean dependent var 11.3046  




Notes: (***), (**), (*) indicate one percent, five percent and ten percent level of 
significance, respectively. 
 
The GLS with SUR estimate did not find a significant relationship between the foreign 
tax rate, rules dummy, the interaction term and turnover and the natural log of EBIT. 
The lack of significance of the rules dummy and the interaction term in this scenario is 
unexpected and not in line with the other scenarios using GLS and SUR. The result 
could be due to the fact that the time period observed is quite short and the data for 
this particular time period may not have shown a strong enough relationship even 
though the other scenarios did.  
 
The GLS with SUR estimates above indicate that eight out of twelve explanatory 
variables are significantly associated with the natural log of EBIT or percentage 
changes in EBIT, while four explanatory variables are statistically insignificant 
determinants of the natural log of EBIT.  Total assets, number of employees, interest 
cover ratio, ordinary dividends, stock turnover ratio, total liabilities and the constant 
term are significant at the one percent level of significance. The solvency ratio is 
significant at the five percent significance level. Although most of the control variables 
showed significance, the percentage change in EBIT is relatively small. 
 
a) For a USD1000 increase in total assets, the EBIT of the South African parent 
entity decreases by 0.00000123%. 
b) For every additional employee, the EBIT of the South African parent entity 
decreases by 0.0000245%. 
c) For a one times increase in the interest cover ratio, the EBIT of the South 
African parent entity increases by 0.002686%. 
d) For a USD1000 increase in ordinary dividends, the EBIT of the South African 
parent entity decreases by 0.0000137%. 
e) For a one times increase in the stock turnover ratio, the EBIT of the South 
African parent entity decreases by 0.002405%. 
f) For a USD1000 increase in total liabilities, the EBIT of the South African parent 
entity increases by 0.00000274%. 
g) For a one times increase in the solvency ratio, the EBIT of the South African 





Based on the GLS with SUR results with rules from 2016 - 2017, the effect of transfer 
pricing rules on EBIT is as follows: 
     
 𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = (1.630958. 𝜏) + (−0.308813) 
 
Equation 6.8  
The table below shows the effect on EBIT for each of the different foreign rates of 
taxation.  
 
Table 11: GLS with SUR Estimation Results with rules from 2016-2017 
 
Rules Coefficient  Interaction Coefficient  Foreign tax rate  Effect on EBIT  
-0.308813 1.630958 0.00% -30.88% 
-0.308813 1.630958 1.00% -29.25% 
-0.308813 1.630958 2.00% -27.62% 
-0.308813 1.630958 3.00% -25.99% 
-0.308813 1.630958 4.00% -24.36% 
-0.308813 1.630958 5.00% -22.73% 
-0.308813 1.630958 6.00% -21.10% 
-0.308813 1.630958 7.00% -19.46% 
-0.308813 1.630958 8.00% -17.83% 
-0.308813 1.630958 9.00% -16.20% 
-0.308813 1.630958 10.00% -14.57% 
-0.308813 1.630958 11.00% -12.94% 
-0.308813 1.630958 12.00% -11.31% 
-0.308813 1.630958 13.00% -9.68% 
-0.308813 1.630958 14.00% -8.05% 
-0.308813 1.630958 15.00% -6.42% 
-0.308813 1.630958 16.00% -4.79% 
-0.308813 1.630958 17.00% -3.16% 
-0.308813 1.630958 18.00% -1.52% 
-0.308813 1.630958 19.00% 0.11% 
-0.308813 1.630958 20.00% 1.74% 
-0.308813 1.630958 21.00% 3.37% 




-0.308813 1.630958 23.00% 6.63% 
-0.308813 1.630958 24.00% 8.26% 
-0.308813 1.630958 25.00% 9.89% 
-0.308813 1.630958 26.00% 11.52% 
-0.308813 1.630958 27.00% 13.15% 
-0.308813 1.630958 28.00% 14.79% 
-0.308813 1.630958 29.00% 16.42% 
-0.308813 1.630958 30.00% 18.05% 
-0.308813 1.630958 31.00% 19.68% 
-0.308813 1.630958 32.00% 21.31% 
 
The portion highlighted in blue in the table above, shows which results are in line with 
the expectations. Namely, foreign tax rates between 19% and 27% increased EBIT with 
the addition of transfer pricing rules. Therefore, a greater portion of the results were in 
line with the expectation after the implementation of the 2016 transfer pricing rules, 
compared with the implementation of the 2012 rules.  
 
6.9.3. Transfer Pricing Rules 2017 only  
The following table shows the estimation results of the transfer pricing rules 2017 only 
scenario.  
 
Table 12: Generalised Least Squares with Seemingly Unrelated Regression 
Results 2017 only (Author’s compilation) 
 
Rules 2017 / Dependent Variable: LnEBIT 
Variable Coefficient Std Error t-Statistic Probability 




0.400912 2.658467 0.0100 
Interaction Term: Rules 
2017*Foreign Tax Rate 








Number of employees 
-2.39E-05 
(***) 
7.25E-06 -3.300821 0.0016 
Interest cover ratio 
0.002974 
(***) 




1.79E-06 -7.081125 0.0000 
Solvency ratio 0.010286 (*) 0.006174 1.666001 0.1008 
Stock turnover ratio 
-0.002636 
(***) 




4.54E-07 5.286672 0.0000 




0.328994 31.02855 0.0000 
Weighted Stats 
R-squared 0.934516 Mean dependent var 20.44262  
Adjusted R-squared 0.922708 S.D. dependent var 9.887777  
S.E. of regression 0.904712 Sum squared resid 49.92871  
F-statistic 79.1388 Durbin-Watson stat 2.03445  
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000    
Unweighted Stats 
R-squared 0.888868 Mean dependent var 11.3046  
Sum squared resid 23.76409 Durbin-Watson stat 1.261178  
Notes: (***), (**), (*) indicate one percent, five percent and ten percent level of 
significance, respectively. 
 
The GLS with SUR estimates above indicate that ten out of twelve explanatory 
variables are significantly associated with the natural log of EBIT or percentage 
changes in EBIT, while two explanatory variables are statistically insignificant 
determinants of the natural log of EBIT.  The rules dummy, total assets, number of 
employees, interest cover ratio, ordinary dividends, stock turnover ratio, total liabilities 
and the constant term are significant at the one percent level of significance. The 
interaction term and the solvency ratio are significant at the ten percent significance 
level. Although most of the control variables showed significance, the percentage 





a) When transfer pricing rules are implemented in South Africa, the EBIT of the 
South African parent entity increases by 1.065812%. 
b) When transfer pricing rules are implemented in South Africa, the EBIT of the 
South African parent entity decreases by 2.893246% times the foreign group 
tax rate. This means there is a 2.893246% decrease for every percentage 
increase in the foreign tax rate.  
c) For a USD1000 increase in total assets, the EBIT of the South African parent 
entity decreases by 0.00000108%. 
d) For every additional employee, the EBIT of the South African parent entity 
decreases by 0.0000239%. 
e) For a one times increase in the interest cover ratio, the EBIT of the South 
African parent entity increases by 0.002974%. 
f) For a USD1000 increase in ordinary dividends, the EBIT of the South African 
parent entity decreases by 0.0000127%. 
g) For a one times increase in the stock turnover ratio, the EBIT of the South 
African parent entity decreases by 0.002636%. 
h) For a USD1000 increase in total liabilities, the EBIT of the South African parent 
entity increases by 0.0000024%. 
i) For a one times increase in the solvency ratio, the EBIT of the South African 
parent entity increases by 0.010286%. 
 
Based on the GLS with SUR results with rules in 2017 only, the effect of transfer pricing 
rules on EBIT is as follows: 
   
 𝐿𝑛𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇 = (−2.893246. 𝜏) + (1.065812) 
 
Equation 6.9  







Table 13: GLS with SUR Estimation Results with rules in 2017 only 
 
Rules Coefficient  Interaction Coefficient  Foreign tax rate  Effect on EBIT  
1.065812 -2.893246 0.00% 106.58% 
1.065812 -2.893246 1.00% 103.69% 
1.065812 -2.893246 2.00% 100.79% 
1.065812 -2.893246 3.00% 97.90% 
1.065812 -2.893246 4.00% 95.01% 
1.065812 -2.893246 5.00% 92.11% 
1.065812 -2.893246 6.00% 89.22% 
1.065812 -2.893246 7.00% 86.33% 
1.065812 -2.893246 8.00% 83.44% 
1.065812 -2.893246 9.00% 80.54% 
1.065812 -2.893246 10.00% 77.65% 
1.065812 -2.893246 11.00% 74.76% 
1.065812 -2.893246 12.00% 71.86% 
1.065812 -2.893246 13.00% 68.97% 
1.065812 -2.893246 14.00% 66.08% 
1.065812 -2.893246 15.00% 63.18% 
1.065812 -2.893246 16.00% 60.29% 
1.065812 -2.893246 17.00% 57.40% 
1.065812 -2.893246 18.00% 54.50% 
1.065812 -2.893246 19.00% 51.61% 
1.065812 -2.893246 20.00% 48.72% 
1.065812 -2.893246 21.00% 45.82% 
1.065812 -2.893246 22.00% 42.93% 
1.065812 -2.893246 23.00% 40.04% 
1.065812 -2.893246 24.00% 37.14% 
1.065812 -2.893246 25.00% 34.25% 
1.065812 -2.893246 26.00% 31.36% 
1.065812 -2.893246 27.00% 28.46% 
1.065812 -2.893246 28.00% 25.57% 
1.065812 -2.893246 29.00% 22.68% 




1.065812 -2.893246 31.00% 16.89% 
1.065812 -2.893246 32.00% 14.00% 
 
The portion highlighted in blue in the table above, shows which results are in line with 
the expectations. Namely, foreign tax rates between 0% and 27% increased EBIT with 
the addition of transfer pricing rules. This is in line with the expectation stated in section 
6.4. Therefore, a greater portion of the results were in line with the expectation after the 
implementation of the 2017 transfer pricing rules, compared with the implementation of 
the 2016 rules. Furthermore, the coefficient of the rules dummy is positive, as expected.  
 
6.9.4. Summary of standard GLS with SUR results  
The following figure summarises the percentage changes in EBIT for each different 
average foreign tax rate in each of the three transfer pricing rules scenarios.  
 
Figure 7: Change in EBIT with the introduction of transfer pricing rules in all 
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The figure above shows that with each improvement or tightening of the transfer pricing 
rules 2012 versus 2016 versus 2017, more of the average group foreign tax rates begin 
to show an increase in South African EBIT. This can be interpreted as an indication 
that the tightening of transfer pricing rules leads to a reduction in profit shifting, based 
on the understanding that reduced profit shifting by South African MNEs would increase 
their South African profitability (i.e. increasing the amount of profits available to be taxed 
in South Africa).  
 
Therefore, the results of the model using the GLS with SUR estimation technique were 
partially in line with the expectations set forth in section 6.4. above when the rules were 
less stringent (2012) and become increasingly more in line with the expectations as the 
rules become more stringent (2016) and are completely in line with the expectations 
when the rules are the most stringent (2017). 
 
6.10. Review of the results  
As the previous sections have shown, both estimation techniques showed similar trends, 
namely that the results of the estimation of the model became increasingly more in line 
with the expectations as the transfer pricing rules became more stringent. This is in 
indication that the introduction, and more specifically, the tightening, of transfer pricing 
rules can be successful in deterring profit shifting.  
 
In the following section, the quality of the analysis is evaluated.  
 
6.11. Evaluating the quality of a regression analysis  
Studenmund (2011) explains that there a number of questions that should be asked in 
order to evaluate the regression results. Some examples include the following:  
a) Is the equation supported by sound theory?  
b) How well do the estimated coefficients correspond to the expectations 
developed by the researcher before the data was collected?  
c) How well does the estimated regression fit the data?  
d) Has the best estimator been used for the equation?  
  
The first question is answered in chapters 1 through 5 of this text, while questions two 





6.11.1. Consideration of the expectations versus the results  
The results of the model using the standard OLS and the GLS with SUR estimation 
technique were partially in line with the expectations set forth in section 6.4. above 
when the rules were less stringent (2012) and become increasingly more in line with 
the expectations as the rules become more stringent (2016) and are completely in line 
with the expectations when the rules are the most stringent (2017) i.e. in the third 
scenario there is a resultant increase in EBIT whenever the average foreign corporate 
tax rate is below 28% (i.e. 𝛽2(𝜏𝑖𝑡  . 𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡) +  𝛽3𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 > 0 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑛 𝜏 < 28%).  
 
Therefore, both the standard OLS and the GLS SUR results are in line with the 
expectations stated in section 6.4 above and are line with the baseline findings of Riedel 
et al. (2015) when the rules are the most stringent (2017) and somewhat in line with 
the expectations when the rules were less stringent (2012 and 2016).  
 
In addition, the purpose of the model is to assess the relationship of the transfer pricing 
rules on profit shifting. Therefore, the significance of the transfer pricing rules and the 
interaction term variables should be considered. These variables are not found to be 
significant in any of the scenarios using OLS whereas these variables are found to be 
significant using GLS with SUR in the 2012-2017 and 2017 only transfer pricing rules 
scenarios. Therefore, the GLS with SUR provides more significant estimates than the 
OLS does under these scenarios.    
 
6.11.2. Assessing the fit of the model  
The “fit” of a regression refers to how well an estimated regression explains the 
variation of the dependent variable. Considering the fit of an estimated model is useful 
for evaluating the quality of a model and for comparing models (Studenmund, 2011). 
The R squared value measures the percent of variation in the dependent variable that 
can be accounted for or explained by the independent variables (Leamer, 1999). 
 
The most simple and commonly used measure of fit is R squared (R2). R2 is the ratio of 
the explained sum of squares to the total sum of squares:  
 
 
𝑅2 =  
𝐸𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑆𝑆
= 1 − 
𝑅𝑆𝑆
𝑇𝑆𝑆
= 1 − 
∑ 𝑒𝑖
2
∑(𝑌𝑖 −  ?̅?)
2
 





The higher the R2 is, the closer the estimated regression equation fits the sample data. 
R2 would fall within the following interval and a value close to one would represent an 
excellent overall fit and a value close to zero would represent a poor fit meaning that 
the estimated regression equation fails to explain the values of the dependent variable 
(𝑌𝑖) any better than the sample mean (?̅?) would:  
 
 0 ≤  𝑅2 ≤ 1 
 
Equation 6.11  
In addition, the p-value of the entire regression can also be considered - a low value 
would imply that at least some of the regression parameters are not equal to zero and 
that the regression equation does have some validity in fitting the data (i.e., the 
independent variables are not purely random with respect to the dependent variable).  
 
The following table provides the 𝑅2 and the p-values of the regression in each dummy 
scenario and using the standard OLS and GLS with SUR techniques respectively.  
 
Table 14: R-Squared Results  
 
  R SQUARED p-value  
2012 OLS 0.890745 0.000000 
 GLS 0.922289 0.000000 
2016 OLS 0.886974 0.000000 
 GLS 0.914856 0.000000 
2017 OLS 0.891366 0.000000 
 GLS 0.934516 0.000000 
 
Based in the table above, the p-values are the same in all instances, specifically the 
regression is significant at the one percent level in all dummy scenarios under both 
estimation techniques. This means the null-hypothesis can always be rejected and it 
can be concluded that both the standard OLS and the GLS with SUR provides a better 






The fact that the p-values are as low as they are means that we could not have obtained 
the results if the null hypothesis held true; therefore, there must be a relationship 
between the estimated variable(s) and the dependent variable in all cases. Therefore, 
when only the p-values are considered, neither technique provides a better fit or higher 
significance than the other.  
 
However, when the R squared is considered it is clear that the SUR model always 
provides a better fit for the data as compared with the standard OLS as it is always 
higher for every dummy scenario.  
 
The figures below depict the R squared for each of the estimation techniques in each 




Based on the value of the 𝑅2, the standard OLS estimation technique leaves 11% of 
the variation in EBIT unexplained in each dummy scenario, whereas the SUR 
estimation technique leaves only 7%, 8% and 6% of the variation in EBIT unexplained 
in each of the dummy scenarios respectively.  
 
Therefore, the SUR technique appears to provide an estimated regression equation 
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Figure 9: Standard GLS with SUR R 
Squared Results 





6.11.3. Decision on the most appropriate estimator  
As explained in Chapter 5, SUR corrects for the suspected heteroscedasticity and 
general correlation of observations within a cross-section (Zellner, 1962). Correlation 
of the results was identified by the EViews programme and in addition it is noted that 
the panel may be correlated because the same set of firms are being observed over a 
period of time and the year on year results could be correlated. The results of the 
different firms may also be correlated due to similarities between their respective 
industries. In addition, some of the firm data collected may be related due to being listed 
or unlisted companies. All of the above may result in correlation of the error terms.   
 
Since contemporaneous correlation is suspected, an estimator that succeeds in 
correcting for correlation would be preferred. In order to determine the level of first-
order serial correlation that exists in the error term with each estimation, the Durbin-
Watson statistic can be considered. The statistic examines the residuals of a particular 
estimation of an equation in order to determine whether there is first-order serial 
correlation in the error term (Studenmund, 2011). The Durbin-Watson statistic equals 
zero if there is extreme positive serial correlation, four if there is extreme negative serial 
correlation and two if there is no serial correlation (Studenmund, 2011). The Durbin-
Watson statistic for each estimator under each dummy scenario is displayed in the table 
below.  
 
Table 15: Durbin-Watson statistics  
 
  Durbin-Watson Statistic Distance from 2 
2012 OLS 1.308469 0.691531 
 GLS 2.084087 -0.084087 
2016 OLS 1.222691 0.777309 
 GLS 1.959957 0.040043 
2017 OLS 1.187739 0.812261 
 GLS 2.03445 -0.03445 
 
Based on the table above, the GLS with SUR results always produce a Durbin-Watson 
statistic that is closer to two compared with the OLS results. In general, the GLS with 




SUR effectively corrects for the suspected contemporaneous correlation. Therefore, 
the GLS with SUR provides better estimates than standard OLS does.  
 
Therefore, the GLS with SUR technique is preferred as it corrects for contemporaneous 
correlation and as explained in the preceding sections, the GLS with SUR technique 
yields a better fit of the estimated regression as can be seen by the higher R2.  
 
Based on each of the techniques employed in estimating the model above and the 
analysis thereof, the GLS with SUR technique appears to be the most appropriate 
estimator of the regression analysis when utilising this particular dataset.  
 
6.12. Conclusion  
Based on the econometric analysis performed and empirical findings, it is shown that with 
each improvement or tightening of the transfer pricing rules 2012 versus 2016 versus 
2017, more of the average group foreign tax rates begin to show an increase in South 
African EBIT. This can be interpreted as an indication that the tightening of transfer pricing 
rules leads to a reduction in profit shifting, based on the understanding that increases in 
South African profitability is an indication of reduced profit shifting by South African MNEs 
(i.e. by increasing the amount of profits available to be taxed in South Africa).  
 
The results of the model using the OLS and using the GLS with SUR estimation technique 
were partially in line with the expectations set forth in section 6.4. above when the rules 
were less stringent (2012) and become increasingly more in line with the expectations as 
the rules become more stringent (2016) and are completely in line with the expectations 
when the rules are the most stringent (2017). However, it is determined that the GLS with 
SUR is the better estimator of the regression for the particular dataset. 
 
The results are in line with the expectations of the analysis and with the previous findings 
of Riedel et al. (2015). However, whilst Riedel et al. (2015) selected a sample of European 
companies, which formed part of an MNE group, this study focussed on a sample of South 
African companies. As mentioned in Chapter 2, South Africa is considered to be a 
developing economy. Therefore, although it was expected, it was uncertain whether the 
results would follow the Riedel et al. (2015) findings. The reason for the uncertainty is due 
to the fact that transfer pricing regulations place a high administrative burden on tax 




administrative capacity required in order to properly enforce the regulations (Nhema, 
2016). Furthermore the study performed by Wier (2018), found that transfer mispricing fell 
in the immediate aftermath of the previous change in South African transfer pricing 
regulations (2012 – 2014) but later (2015) returned to its initial level since companies’ fear 
of higher audit risk led to the initial response of a reduction in transfer mispricing; but it 
then became clear that the tax authority (SARS) did not increase its administrative 
capabilities in order to ensure compliance; therefore, the effect of the reform disappeared.  
 
Based on the sample selected and the analysis performed, it was found that the results 
follow the trend identified by Riedel et al. (2015) and profit shifting is reduced following the 
implementation of the regulations. Furthermore, the results follow a trend where the 
tightening of the rules leads to a further reduction in profit shifting. However, as mentioned 
above, in order for the regulations to continue to effectively deter profit shifting, focus 
needs to be placed on improving the administrative capabilities of the tax authorities in 
order to ensure they can successfully enforce the regulations going forward.  
 





CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
7.1. Introduction  
This chapter concludes the study, presents the summary of empirical findings and 
provides areas of further research. 
 
7.2. Summary of the study  
The objective of this study was to investigate the factors that determine and deter profit 
shifting with the focus on transfer pricing. The study was motivated both by the harmful 
effects of profit shifting and importance of tax revenues to South Africa as a developing 
country.  
 
The study pursued two specific objectives to empirically examine the determinants and 
deterrents of profit shifting. The first objective was to review the information available on 
profit shifting. The second objective was to examine the effect of legislative policy on profit 
shifting using a sample of South African MNEs.  
 
The study tested three hypotheses:  
a) That profit shifting is a real occurrence that can have harmful effects on a country 
by eroding its tax base, reducing tax revenues and thus impeding development 
due to a lack of resources.  
b) That the utilisation of legislative measures through the adoption of transfer pricing 
regulations in South Africa will lead to a reduction in the occurrence of profit 
shifting by multinationals operating in the country under the assumption that all 
conditions are met:  the political will to implement the tax system effectively, a 
clear strategy regarding how to implement the tax system, and adequate 
resources in order to complete the implementation.  
c) That the tightening of the legislative measures would lead to further reductions in 
the occurrence of profit shifting by multinationals operating in the country under 
the assumption that all conditions are met:  the political will to implement the tax 
system effectively, a clear strategy regarding how to implement the tax system, 
and adequate resources in order to complete the implementation. 
 
The study begins with a background on the importance of CIT revenues in South Africa 




explain the concepts of globalisation and tax competition and also provides further details 
on how profit shifting affects an economy.  A literature review was then presented, which 
explored the existing literature on the profit shifting phenomenon, its existence and impact 
on the world and the potential countermeasures, which could be employed in response to 
this phenomenon. Following that, further relevant statistics on CIT in the South African 
context and the relevant CIT and transfer pricing policies in South Africa were presented 
as well as the relevant studies performed in response to BEPS.  
 
Following the extensive literature review, the research study was then presented, 
beginning with a description of the research methodology utilised in performing the 
research study, including descriptions of the data collected, the method of analysis and 
the assumptions and expectations of the study.  
 
The empirical study utilised a simplified version of a developed empirical model, which is 
employed with a relevant South African dataset so as to consider the effect of legislative 
policy through the implementation of explicit and stringent transfer pricing rules on a 
sample of South African parented MNEs. The equation was estimated using both standard 
OLS and GLS with SUR techniques and the results and analysis thereof are presented in 
the preceding chapter. It is noted that the use of GLS with the SUR technique was 
determined to be more suitable to the dataset than the standard OLS.  
 
Finally, the econometric analysis and the empirical findings were presented and analysed. 
 
7.3. Summary of the empirical findings   
Based on the econometric analysis performed and empirical findings, a sample of South 
African parented MNE groups showed increases in the percentages of EBIT reported 
following the introduction of transfer pricing rules. This is in line with the expectations of 
the analysis and with the previous findings of Riedel et al. (2015).  
 
However, whilst Riedel et al. (2015) selected a sample of European companies, which 
formed part of an MNE group, this study focussed on a sample of South African 
companies. Since South Africa is considered to be a developing economy, it was uncertain 
whether the results would follow the Riedel et al. (2015) findings because of the high level 






However, based on the sample selected and the analysis performed, it was found that the 
results follow the trend identified by Riedel et al. (2015) and the introduction of transfer 
pricing regulations reduced profit shifting in the sample of South African companies. 
 
This research also provided an additional contribution compared with the Wier (2018) 
study because this study considers the impact of the tightening of transfer pricing rules in 
2016 and 2017, in addition to the 2012 change, which Wier (2018) considers.  
 
7.4. Recommendations 
It is noted that the study performed by Wier (2018), found that transfer mispricing 
decreased immediately (2012 – 2014) after the 2012 change in transfer pricing legislation 
but in 2015 rose back to its initial level. Initially, taxpayers were concerned about the higher 
risk of being audited. However, after some time, it became apparent that SARS had not 
increased its administrative capabilities in order to actually conduct audits. Therefore, the 
effect of the 2012 reform disappeared.  
 
However, over the past few years, SARS has significantly improved its capabilities in 
terms of the recruitment of skilled individuals and the creation of specialised teams to deal 
specifically with transfer pricing matters and transfer pricing audits. Therefore, there is a 
good chance that the effect of the 2016/2017 will not dissipate and the reform will continue 
to gain momentum as SARS continues to build its administrative resources and 
capabilities. However, it is essential that the South African government and other 
governments place focus on their ability to ensure the regulations are enforced if they want 
to ensure the regulations continue to be an effective deterrent in profit shifting away from 
their countries. One of the ways in which this is being addressed is through an initiative 
by the OECD and the African Tax Administration Forum (ATAF) to work together to 
improve tax systems in Africa. The parties signed a Memorandum of Co-operation in 
October 2012 and have since been conducting joint activities in order to obtain their 
objective (African Tax Adminstration Forum, 2012). However, it is noted that although 
steps have been taken to improve SARS’ capabilities, the revenue authority is still 
experiencing certain inefficiencies and further improvement is required (National Treasury, 
2019).  According to the DTC (2016), it is important for SARS to continue building its 




taxpayers need assurance that the taxes collected are being spent prudently and invested 
so as to provide benefits for the country. 
 
In addition to noting the importance of administrative capabilities in deterring profit shifting, 
the DTC (2016) also noted that in order to ensure comprehensive protection against BEPS 
in South Africa, policy makers must also consider the development and communication of 
clear policies on tax incentives and treaty negotiations.  
 
Since this study was performed very close to the beginning of the current reform, future 
research could be conducted on a similar sample after several years in order to determine 
whether the regulations continue to have the same effect on profit shifting in the future.  
 
In addition, the study focussed on a relatively small South African sample due the limited 
information available at the time of conducting the research. As noted, there is an overall 
shortage of reliable data for independent companies operating in emerging or developing 
economies. Therefore, future research could be performed using a larger sample. 
However, this would depend on the availability of financial information in this regard.  
 
Finally, the rules themselves also need to be considered on an ongoing basis in line with 
the principles of an effective tax system, namely, equity, efficiency, certainty and simplicity. 
Care should be taken by the revenue authority and policy makers to ensure that the rules 
are effective in curbing profit shifting but are not overly complex or burdensome on the 
taxpayer. The DTC released a series of final reports in April 2018 where the committee 
noted that tax legislation may be becoming too onerous and compliance and reporting 
requirements too burdensome and expensive to comply with. It is further noted that the 
main purpose of the South African tax system is to collect revenue and the tax system 
alone cannot address all the impairments to economic growth and social growth – further 
levels of involvement from government are required in this regard. However, future 
research could consider to what extent the tax system is able to influence behavioural 
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